THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT ROLE OF
ARGENTINA FOR US FIRMS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH OPERATIONS IN MERCOSUR
by Ivanna Garibaldi ©
Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College
of The City University of New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Business Administration in International
Marketing with Honors.

| TABLES |
| TABLE 1 |
"Economic indicators of the major trading blocs" |
| TABLE 2 |
"Mercosur in numbers: 1996" |
| TABLE 3 |
"Mercosur global trade" |
| TABLE 4 |
"Mercosur's trade with US" |
| TABLE 5 |
"Export growth rate and trade growth rate" |
| TABLE 6 |
"Foreign trade relative to GDP" |
| TABLE 7 |
"Argentine exports by category: 1996" |
| TABLE 8 |
"Argentine imports by category: 1996" |
| TABLE 9 |
"Argentina's top trading partners" |
| TABLE 10 |
"US financial investment position in Argentina" |
| TABLE 11 |
"US direct investment position in Argentina" |
| TABLE 12 |
"US direct investment position by industry" |
| TABLE 13 |
"Argentina's annual inflation rate, consumer prices" |
| TABLE 14 |
"Annual inflation: selected countries: 1996" |
| TABLE 15 |
"Agriculture items in demand" |
| TABLE 16 |
"Aerospace items in demand" |
| TABLE 17 |
"Computer products in demand" |
| TABLE 18 |
"Electricity items in demand" |
| TABLE 19 |
"Major opportunities for US companies in sectors of privatization"
|

| FIGURES |
| FIGURE 1 |
"Mercosur intra-regional trade: 1981-1997 |
| FIGURE 2 |
"Mercosur global trade" |
| FIGURE 3 |
"Mercosur global trade: segmented into regions" |
| FIGURE 4 |
"Argentina's trade with Mercosur" |
| FIGURE 4a* |
"Structure of imports" |
| FIGURE 4b* |
"Structure of exports" |
| FIGURE 7 |
"US direct investment by industry" |
| FIGURE 8 |
"Primary fiscal result without capital resources" |
| FIGURE 9 |
"University students per 100,000 inhabitants" |
| FIGURE 10 |
"Argentine opinion poll on privatizations" |
| FIGURE 11 |
"Unemployment rate: 1993 - 2000 (projected)" |
| FIGURE 12 |
"Corruption in the minds of the Argentine" |
| FIGURE 13 |
"Mercosur's overall impact: survey 1997" |
| * No Figure 5 or 6 in the original. |

This thesis presents Argentina as a "trade bridge" to Mercosur. It
was on March 26, 1991 that Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
signed the agreement to enlarge their domestic markets through economic
integration.
The concept of "trade bridge" depicts Argentina as a potential link
for American firms seeking to invest in and trade with the rest of the
Mercosur nations. Argentina can be the principal gateway into these
other emerging markets and establish the first means by which this expansion
can take place. This thesis attempts to answer key questions such as:
- Is Argentina more suitable for trade with US companies than the
other Mercosur countries? and if so, why?
- Which US industries will benefit? How will specific industry participation
affect Argentine-US trade and overall investment flows?
- How can American companies benefit from trade and investment with
Argentina, and through Argentina, trading with Mercosur countries?
As the countries within Mercosur consolidate their respective programs
of modernization, regional economic integration will move forward even
more rapidly, since the existence of Mercosur will indeed ease the coordination
of trade, exchange rate, fiscal, credit, and other macro-economic and
sectoral policies. (Carlsson, 1997)
Within Mercosur, Argentina has not only reversed the poor economic
performance evident during the past ten years, but during the 1990's
its economic improvement has been of the most successful of Western
nations. (Campbell, 1997).
Trade patterns and foreign investments volume has increased dramatically
as a result of improved economic conditions, legislation reforms and
privatization efforts. After Brazil, the US represents the most important
trade partner for Argentina. Since 1989 activity between the two nations
has evolved into a dynamic exchange of goods and services. The most
notable evidence of this, are the increased establishments of operations
by top American companies in Argentina. Another notable example are
the innumerable privatization projects in which US firms have so far
dominated.
There are vast opportunities in distinct industries including food,
chemicals, automotive, mining, communications, petroleum and natural
gas, computer services, insurance and banking, hotels and supermarkets.
The greatest opportunity for US firms exists in the technology-service
industry including automation through computers, networking devices
and other telecommunication products. Argentina represents a growing
market which possesses a population whose purchasing power and consumer
needs are increasing at record pace. It is necessary for these firms
to realize the potential "link" that Argentina can establish for future
expansion into the other Mercosur nations.
Argentina as a "trade bridge" will link these US companies to a region
of vast economic growth and wondrous opportunities in terns of market
size, future prospects in trade and investment and sustainable growing
trends.

Globalization of the world economy, enhancement of free trade frontiers
together with the reduction of customs tariffs and the creation of a
new organization known as the World Trade Organization (WTO: which is
widely empowered to enforce international treaties) are extremely important
aspects of today's global trade trends. These collectively reveal that
the recent economic growth of countries is closely related to trade
dynamization and expansion within increasingly wider geographic areas.
( Herrera-Vegas, 1996).
Perhaps the most recent example of this has been last April 19th's
Summit Meeting of The Americas in the city of Santiago, Chile. It was
there that leaders of 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere took a
first step toward creating the world's largest free trade zone, one
that would span then Americas. In a joint declaration signed by President
Clinton and 21 other presidents and 12 prime ministers, the leaders
said that talks on the subject would begin in September and they pledged
to make "Concrete progress" toward a goal of signing an agreement by
2005. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would have 34 member
nations (Cuba is not included) with 750 million people and a gross domestic
product of more than US$ 9 Trillion. The United States accounts for
85% of the region's economy. (Sims, 1998).
The important advances made in these trade expansion and integration
agreements suggest that they are not only a necessity for growth, but
also that isolation may threaten the subsistence of those nations that
do not succeed in finding their way to enter these processes of trade
frontier enhancements. (Hoopes, 1996)
Regional integration and participation in trade agreements is usually
based on the reciprocal extension of trade privileges and as such these
agreements serve to lower tariffs, eliminate quota restrictions, or
otherwise remove protectionist barriers to cross-border trade between
nationals of member countries. Global and regional trade agreements
may contribute significantly to future prosperity and freedom of world
markets and it is in this way that regional integration represents a
crucial element for economic growth (de la Balze, 1996)
A most notable example of this is Argentina's current trade policy
and how thoroughly it embraces the notion of free markets. To encourage
foreign investment and open Argentina's markets to the forces of competition,
the administration in power since 1989 has employed unilateral market
liberalization and stabilization measures in combination with multinational
and regional trade agreements like Mercosur. Such liberalization measures
have boosted production and caused the domestic economy to expand greatly.
In an effort to encourage export opportunities, the country has aggressively
pursued membership in such agreements (Borner, 1994).
Regional Economic Integration
The processes of economic regional integration that have developed
or are being developed in the world, may be classified according to
their higher or lower degree of integration. (Cateora, 1996).
They are as follows:
1. Free Trade Zone (or FTZ): To facilitate export trade, countries
designate areas within their borders as customs-privileged areas where
manufacturers can assemble their products without paying tariffs on
the imported parts until they enter a country and are for sale. Some
countries designate a factory or a warehouse where goods can be stored
or assembled; others designate an entire area as an FTZ.
2. Free Trade Area (or FTA): It is an agreement between two
or more nations to reduce or eliminate customs duties and non-tariff
trade barriers among partner countries while members maintain individual
tariff schedules for external countries. It provides its members with
a "mass market" without barriers that impede the flow of goods and services.
(Ex: NAFTA)
3. Customs Union: It represents the next stage in economic cooperation.
It enjoys the free-trade areas' reduced or eliminated internal tariffs
and adds a common external tariff on products imported from countries
outside the union. The Customs Union (as is Mercosur) is a logical step
in the transition
4. Common Market: It eliminates all tariffs and o ther restrictions
on internal trade, adopts a set of common external tariffs, and removes
all restriction on the free flow of capital and labor among member nations.
It is a "unified economy", but lacks "political unity" to become a Political
Union (Economic Union)
5. Economic Union: This represents the most fully integrated
form of regional cooperation. It involves complete political and economic
integration; it may voluntary or enforced. At its ideal point it may
involve the free flow between borders of all factors of productions
(such as where the EU is evolving into). Another example is The Commonwealth
of Nations which represents the loosest possible, voluntary relationship
that can be classified as economic integration.
There is no question that during the last 15 years a new trend towards
globalization of the economy has emerged world wide. Examples of the
new trend include NAFTA, EU, APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation),
and of course Mercosur. It was on March 26, 1991 that Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the agreement to enlarge their domestic
markets through this economic integration. Mercosur is the most recent
regional trade agreement which certainly appears to be drawing increasing
attention from world investors. It represents an unavoidable actor in
the field of global commerce and economy (Hoopes, 1996). Mercosur has
evolved into the 4th largest economic group in the world and the second
largest Customs Union after the EU.
Table 1
ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE MAJOR TRADING BLOCS
| |
GDP ($Trillion) |
POPULATION |
GDP Per Capita |
EXPORTS ($Billion) |
| NAFTA |
7.5 |
378 |
19988 |
712 |
| EU |
7.2 |
364 |
19781 |
1651 |
| PACIFIC RIM * |
5.8 |
470 |
12279 |
973 |
| MERCOSUR |
0.8 |
204 |
4327 |
62 |
* Comprised of Japan, Korea, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand,
and Indonesia.
It is interesting to note that the members of NAFTA and Mercosur are
the principal economic players of the Western Hemisphere. Combined they
represent 96 percent of the hemisphere's total GDP. The importance of
Mercosur for the United States is reflected by the fact that more than
55 percent of its exports to South America are currently concentrated
in the four Mercosur countries, and 65 percent of the United States'
foreign direct investment in South America is in the Mercosur member
nations. (Carlsson, 1997)

Argentina represents a positive business environment for firms through
its market based economy, its favorable legal framework for investments,
its efficient service infrastructure and its highly skilled human resources.
For these reasons I will examine the role of Argentina within Mercosur
and determine whether and how US firms can take advantage of this in
terms of both investment and trade.
Argentina represents a "trade bridge" into Mercosur through its currently
favorable socio-economic climate of growth and long-term stability.
There are several industries which present great investment opportunities
for American firms wishing to invest capital as well as those companies
wishing to engage in exporting, joint ventures or other means of market
penetration.
In order to illustrate the gateway that Argentina represents for US
firms seeking to invest and engage in trade within Mercosur I examine
several critical questions in this thesis. The first set of these, concerning
Argentina's basic economic conditions, are:
- How has Mercosur affected Argentina's economic growth?
- In which of the nation's economic variables is this growth most
evident?
- Haw has this apparent "trade and investment drive" accelerated
Argentine economic recovery?
In order to answer these questions in depth, I analyzed Argentina's
basic economic indicators conducting a Pre-Post study (1987-1997) of
the figures prior to Mercosur's existence and after its signing into
effect. I compare the changes in the major indicators before Mercosur
and then the indicators following a few years after Mercosur. This will
indicate the nature and degree of influence the regional agreement had
on the nation's overall economic and trade environment.
Most of the figures researched are from The UN Statistical Abstract
of the World (Third Edition) and the Statistical Yearbook (40th issue),
recent publications, and current newspaper articles on the subject from
The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Business Week, Latin Trade,
Financial Times, and some Argentine publications including Clarin and
La Nacion.
The general economic variables I study are:
| Economy: |
|
| 1) Real GDP |
7) Average Exchange Rate |
| 2) Fiscal Balance Ratio |
8) GDP Per Capita |
| 3) Foreign Exchange Reserves |
9) Unemployment Rate |
| 4) GDP Growth Rate |
10) Foreign Debt |
| 5) Inflation (% year end) |
11) Consumption |
| 6) Foreign Debt |
12) Investment (domestic) |
These economic indicators are closely observed to determine each one's
behavior as a result of Mercosur's creation and I will attempt to measure
the observable impact of Mercosur on them individually and then the
impact on them within the framework of the whole economy.
Clearly, during 1995 and 1996, the economy has been accomplishing the
principal criteria for sustained growth. (Fidler, 1997). It is interesting
to dissect the major sectors of the economic environment to determine
what the results have been and what future prospects can be predicted
through trend analysis. For example, even though the nation's economy
has flourished under the new stabilization, unemployment rates have
not decreased dramatically and this represents a major area of concern
for the nation's people. My objective is to examine these variables
and closely study the current situation and how it all relates to Argentina's
performance and participation within the framework of Mercosur.
| Trade: |
| 1) US Exports (FAS $ million) |
| 2) US Imports (C. V $ million) |
| 3) Total Country Exports (FOB $ million) |
| 4) Total Country Imports (CIF $ million) |
| 5) Trade Balance ($ million) |
After running a strong deficit in 1994, Argentina's trade balance
moved solidly into surplus after the first quarter of 1995 as exports
climbed sharply and imports declined slightly. The development of trade
with Brazil under the protection of Mercosur has become an important
element of Argentina's trade strategy. Mercosur is viewed as "the most
effective" tool Argentina has to promote long-term economic growth.
For example, in the agricultural sector alone, Argentina ran a US$1.3
billion surplus in its trade with the other three Mercosur members.
(Decker, 1997). I will examine impacts and results such as these for
the major sectors of the economy.
I also describe the changes in the flow of investment before and after
the implementation of Mercosur in 1991. It is important to note that
as a result of the development of Mercosur, there has been not only
a dramatic increase in trade, but also an even greater increase in the
flow of foreign investment into the country. (Diaz, 1996).
In addition, I examine the trade impact both within the Mercosur (intra-regional
trade) and between Argentina and other non-member nations paying particular
attention to the United States, Japan, the EU nations, and other Latin
American countries which are not currently Mercosur members. I compare
the Argentine export and import figures and break the numbers down into
total Argentine imports and exports to Mercosur, USA, EU and other countries
(subdivided into Japan, Mexico, Canada, and other Latin American nations.
My contribution determines the reasons for these recent increases in
trade activity and foreign investment. Most importantly I quantify Mercosur's
observable impact on these recent developments.
-Does Argentina's membership in Mercosur guarantee the nation more
active investment sectors? And if yes, why and how much?
Is Argentina indeed more suitable for trade with American firms
than other Mercosur nations?
-What are the Selection Criteria ?
Asking this question and attempting to answer it implicitly gives the
notion that despite Mercosur (tending towards a market) each country
is distinct as a trading partner and that a US firm, despite economic
advantages offered by the region, common should focus on a single country
to achieve greater results.
The question should be looked at from the point of view of a comparative
analysis between the member nations. What socio-economic characteristics
does Argentina have that the other member nations lack?
A comparison across the four nations (paying attention at basic data,
historical background, as well recent trends in their business climates)
enables the analysis of the information and interpretation of the reasons
why Argentina presently represents the strongest market in terms of
size, purchasing power, educational attainment and socio-political stability.
What Are The Present Investment and Trade Opportunities Available
for US Firms in Argentina?
-Which industries and sectors of the economy (products, services)?
-Privatization involving US firms' capital investments?
How can these American firms take advantage of the opportunities
in Argentina to trade and invest in other member nations?
To answer these questions I examine the current conditions existing
in Argentina (within the framework of Mercosur) and what opportunities
exist for American firms wishing to export there, make a foreign direct
investment and some other form of market entry or invest intense capital
or even engage in other means of market penetration (such as: strategic
alliances, and other licensing agreements).
Indeed, the reduction --if not the removal-- of non tariff restrictions
(through Mercosur) on the import of consumer goods has opened up the
market to imports and increased the sales of many products. (Hinkelman,
1996). Improved economic conditions are increasing consumers' discretionary
income. Since 1993 the demand for imported goods has slowed somewhat
following the initial boom period in February of 1991, but a moderate
to very strong demand continues to exist virtually across the board
for capital, intermediate and consumer goods. In addition, even when
domestic industries are filling most of the current demand in their
particular markets, they are increasingly relying on imported materials
and components, as well as on capital goods, creating additional markets
for foreign suppliers. (Hinkelman, 1996).
I establish the particular industries in which both export and import
opportunities exist for US firms and examine the future prospects in
the coming few years and how Mercosur's growth will affect this. Some
of the industries are: aerospace, computers and software, construction
materials, electricity, industrial equipment, medical and scientific
equipment, motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and telecommunications.
These specific industries were selected as they are the sectors in which
great opportunities for growth exist and where US firms can achieve
the highest benefits if they decide to engage in trade in the above
areas.
There have been many reasons for the current foreign investment boom
in Argentina including new legislation (Argentine Foreign Investment
Act of 1993), and political, social and economic stability. FDI continues
its heated pace ever since the signing of Mercosur, remaining strong
in the last few years. Cumulative, recorded, direct, non financial inflows
of foreign investment (investments other than portfolio investment placed
in securities that can be liquidated the initial boom period in February
of 1991, but a moderate to very strong demand continues to exist virtually
across the board for capital, intermediate and consumer goods. In addition,
even when domestic industries are filling most of the current demand
in their particular markets, they are increasingly relying on imported
materials and components, as well as on capital goods, creating additional
markets for foreign suppliers.(Hinkelman, 1996).
I establish the particular industries in which both export and import
opportunities exist for US firms and examine the future prospects in
the coming few years and how Mercosur's growth will affect this. Some
of the industries are: aerospace, computers and software, construction
materials, electricity, industrial equipment, medical and scientific
equipment, motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and telecommunications.
These specific industries were selected as they are the sectors in which
great opportunities for growth exist and where US firms can achieve
the highest benefits if they decide to engage in trade in the above
areas.
There have been many reasons for the current foreign investment boom
in Argentina including new legislation (Argentine Foreign Investment
Act of 1993), and political, social and economic stability. FDI continues
its heated pace ever since the signing of Mercosur, remaining strong
in the last few years. Cumulative, recorded, direct, non financial inflows
of foreign investment (investments other than portfolio investment placed
in securities that can be liquidated rapidly --the so called "hot money")
in Argentina as of year end 1993 amounted to approximately US$ 28 billion
between 1990-93; the third largest inflow among emerging markets worldwide.
(Hinkelman, 1996)
Private capital inflow in 1992 almost reached US$ 8 billion and was
slightly more than US$5 billion for 1993. With privatization largely
completed, the massive capital inflows of the early 1990's are expected
to subside somewhat. However, assuming continued growth and stability,
foreign investment should remain in a surplus position for the remainder
of the decade, although observers expect annual flows to level off at
figure around US$ 2 billion (Hoopes, 1996)
I examine FDI's past history in Argentina and the trends that were
evident prior to Mercosur (perhaps dating back to 1987) and then compare
with the current booming situation in Argentina. I explain the extent
of Mercosur's impact on the changes in FDI patterns in Argentina in
the last five to ten years.
I collect both historical data as well as administering a mail survey/
questionnaire to managers of major US firms based in Argentina. Companies
to be surveyed include: General Motors, Lockheed Aircrafts, Lone Star
Industries, NL Industries, telecom Ventures, Unisys, Nortel, Mattel,
just to name a few.
The above were selected because they are the particular ones in which
American firms have a substantial direct capital investment and which
have been identified by the parent firm as a wholly or partially owned
subsidiary, affiliate, or branch. Franchises, representatives and non-commercial
enterprises or institutions, such as hospitals, schools, etc. financed
or operated by American philanthropic or religious organizations are
not included.
The primary source of primary data is the mail surveys / questionnaires
completed by the parent corporations and annual reports provided by
them. Direct telephone contact and personal interviews will be used
extensively for verification and clarification of the functions of subsidiaries
in Argentina. Ideally, the personal interview will be a follow-up to
the completed mail questionnaire in order to clarify major points of
interest not covered previously.
Questionnaire Design (Please
refer to Appendix C for a sample of the questionnaire; PDF file
167 KB)
Questionnaire consists of 26 detailed questions (open ended, multiple
choice, and rating through scales) covering numerous aspects of the
firm's operations in Argentina:
Questions 1-5: cover the location of operations (what major
cities), date of establishment in Argentina, the particular industry
in which the company competes, the relationship with the US headquarters,
and the reasons why the company decided to take operations to Argentina.
Questions 6-8: ask about the current business climate in the
Argentine operations such as whether there has been recent expansion
or contraction and the reasons why, ratings of firm's performance in
comparison to worldwide operations, competitive strength within local
industry.
Questions 9-11: introduces Mercosur within framework of the
company's operations in Argentina. These questions ask about Mercosur's
influence on operations, its potential strengths and weaknesses as it
relates to the particular industry in which the firm is competing.
Questions 12-16: ask about Argentina's overall economic and
business environment, focusing on the factors that have led to US companies'
success or lack of success in the country. The firm is asked to respond
to a series of scale-design questions as to whether they agree or not
agree with statements regarding privatization efforts and the conditions
existing for such projects.
Questions 17-18: focus on Argentina's restructured legal framework.
Companies are asked to rate the level of influence of this new legislation
on their level of investment within the past years and the overall impact
it has or no has had on the firm and industry as a whole.
Questions 19-21: describe the future outlook of the company's
operations in Argentina as well as the possibilities for movement into
neighboring Mercosur nations (Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). Respondents
are also asked to describe the most dramatic changes that the firm has
experienced as a result of Mercosur's implementation.
Questions 22-26: illustrate the company's future strategic plans
as Mercosur eventually grows into a true common market (both long term
and short term prospects and goals). Respondents are also asked to point
out their most important competitive advantages and benefits derived
from having established operations in Argentina and other comments and
opinions they may have regarding the subject.
What has been the social impact of the economic reform in
Argentina?
- in particular, relating to the major socio-demographic segments of
the population?
- How has Mercosur contributed to the overall social climate?
In my research I address the impact that Argentina's economic advance
has had on Argentine society as a whole. I undertake a closer analysis
of population perceptions, attitudes, and opinions on the reforms undertaken,
privatization efforts as well as Mercosur itself. This will enable a
better in depth look into the trade agreements role within the dynamically
evolving Argentine economy.
What this question poses is the issue of the current economic reforms'
impact on employment rates, consumer spending, education levels and
the country's literacy rate. By comparing the major trends existing
today in Argentina and those figures prior to 1989 (beginning of the
economic restructuring period) I can infer the effects (both the positive
and the negative) evident in the lives of the Argentine population
Another aspect of the "social implications" on the agreement which
cannot be quantified, but are indeed observed and studied, are the general
attitude changes and reactions of the people: How they feel about the
economic reforms and Mercosur and how the implementation of these has
benefited them in their everyday life, and how it has altered their
perspective on the current economic situation of the country. In order
to achieve this, I conduct an examination of the recent polls in the
last elections, recent articles and publications in both American and
US magazines and newspapers.
What have been the recent criticisms on Mercosur?
- Counter arguments?
-What is Trade Diversion vs. Trade Creation?
Has Mercosur erected barriers to foreign (non- Mercosur) competition?
Here I analyze the views presented in a very stimulating and well-publicized
academic critique on the South Cone Common Market (Mercosur). I discuss
and interpret perhaps the strongest case written against Mercosur and
attempt to refute each point made by the author: Alexander J. Yeats
(the principal economist from the International Trade Division of the
World Bank, Washington DC).
By gathering supporting data I summarize my findings on the agreement
and enhance its benefits while at the same time counter-arguing Mr.
Yeat's attempts to undermine all that Mercosur has achieved. I focus
on his "key points of attack". It is essential to define the concepts
presented and what exactly is mean by "trade diversion" and "trade creation".
Also, of great importance is measuring the extent of the influence that
this criticism may have no future investment and trade between Mercosur
nations and the rest of the world.
During the last decade, the formation and development of Mercosur have
undoubtedly been two of the main achievements of Argentina and its partners
in a process largely exceeding the "mere" economic and business arena.
Overcoming chronic difficulties and leaving historical regional antagonism
behind, around 1985 the nations of the region took up an ambitious challenge.
Contrary to many predictions, Mercosur has punctually and strictly
complied with each and every schedule agreed. It has even grown to include
some new "associate members" such as Chile and Bolivia (which was discussed
earlier on in the proposal).
In concrete terms, the marked increase in Argentine participation in
international trade has been accompanied by significant growth in "world"
trade with the country, not only for other Mercosur nations, but also
for external economies, such as East Asian countries, the United States
and the European Union. But is it all as it seems?
In other words, is it clear that as a consequence of the creation
of Mercosur, trade volume generated is higher than trade diverted?
How will American firms seeking to become involved in
substantial trade with the Mercosur bloc benefit greatly from viewing
Argentina as this "trade bridge"?
In my research I answer the questions above and prove that regional
integration agreements are not means of protecting members, rather they
are a means of liberalizing trade worldwide and enhancing the emergence
of global, interdependent economies.

Latin America is widely considered the fastest growing area of the
world (alongside South East Asia) and within it, Mercosur is the fastest
growing region representing a single market of 230 million people; more
than 58 percent of Latin America's GDP; 59 percent of its total area;
slightly more than 51 percent of its industrial production and inter-regional
trade and 33% of total Latin American foreign trade. 'Mercosur will
develop faster in the next few years than NAFTA," predicted former US
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a meeting of the Latin America
Business Council last year. (Silva, 1997)
Combined GDP of its member nations (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and
Brazil) is just below US$ 900 million. Its total trade (exports plus
imports) reached 124.4 billion dollars in 1995. In other words, Mercosur
is an integrated market which accounts for more than half the value
of Latin America's main economic indicators, and has an unmistakable
potential and drawing power.
Table 2
MERCOSUR IN NUMBERS 1996
| COUNTRY |
AREA (mill. miles 2) |
(mill) |
REAL GDP ($ bn.) |
| ARGENTINA |
1.08 |
34.1 |
279.4 |
| BRAZIL |
3.28 |
162.2 |
581.3 |
| PARAGUAY |
0.15 |
4.7 |
7.6 |
| URUGUAY |
0.07 |
3.3 |
15.6 |
| TOTAL (Mercosur Nations) |
4.58 |
204.3 |
883.9 |
| UNITED STATES |
3.78 |
260 |
4885 |
Source: Hinkelman, 1996.
Judging by recent developments, the integration process in Mercosur
has made enormous strides and has reached a level of interrelationship
that provides a solid foundation for future, additional progress. (Herrera-Vegas,1996).
Mercosur has created an impressively dynamic market of US$ 1 trillion.
This dynamism is based primarily on bilateral trade between the two
largest economies of South America, Brazil and Argentina. From 1990
to 1994, trade among Mercosur economies of South America, Brazil and
Argentina. From 1990 to 1994, trade among Mercosur countries increased
by 181 percent (roughly 30 percent per year) (Hinkelman, 1996). Without
a doubt Mercosur's greatest impact has been the extraordinary growth
in trade and investment among the member nations.
Figure 1
MERCOSUR INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
1981-1997
Source: The Economist, 1998
As shown in the graph above, intra-regional trade (within member nations)
increased dramatically after 1991, the time around which Mercosur took
an important role in the region's trade patterns. It must be pointed
out that the larger figures have been the result of the two larger nations:
Argentina and Brazil. Estimated total trade at mid 1997 was US$ 17 million
and projected numbers for 1998 may reach the 20 million mark. (Warn,
1998). However, "intra-regional" trade has not been the only area in
which great increases have taken place. Interestingly enough, Mercosur's
overall "global trade" in 1996 increased approximately 43,5% over the
1995 figures. Total trade (exports + imports) reached US$ 135 billion
in 1996.
Figure 2
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
1996

Source: Bannister, 1997
If one takes a closer look at how this global trade pattern is broken
down among the different areas of the world, we see that United States
is the number one trade partner of the Mercosur nations collectively.
Even though, the EU has a greater amount as a whole entity, none of
the other individual nations in the world come close to the US- Mercosur
Trade numbers.
Figure 3
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
1996 (Segmented into regions)

Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997
Table 3
MERCOSUR GLOBAL TRADE
| United States |
20%
|
27 US$ Billion (rounded off from 26.8) |
| European Union |
40%
|
54 US$ Billion |
| Great Britain |
12%
|
6.48 US$ Billion |
| Germany |
10%
|
5.4 US$ Billion |
| France |
9%
|
4.86 US$ Billion |
| Italy |
6%
|
3.24 US$ Billion |
| Spain |
3%
|
1.62 US$ Billion |
| Other Latin American nations |
15%
|
20.25 US$ Billion |
| Asian NICs |
13%
|
17.55 US$ Billion |
| Japan |
5%
|
6.75 US$ Billion |
| Rest of World |
7%
|
9.45 US$ Billion |
| TOTAL |
100%
|
135 US$ Billion |
Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997
Table 4
MERCOSUR'S TRADE WITH U.S
(Mercosur's exports and imports to the U.S)
| (Billion Dollars) |
1995 |
1996 |
| EXPORTS |
13.7 |
16 |
| IMPORTS |
10.7 |
10.8 |
| TOTAL |
24.4 |
26.8 |
| BALANCE |
plus 3 |
plus 5.2 |
Ministry of Economy Report: 1997
Note: Mercosur is the 8th largest export market in the world and
the 12th largest supplier overall.
What is worth mentioning from the US perspective is that eighty percent
of the major American companies in Latin America are settled in Mercosur
and even though the principal trade and investment partner is by far
the EU (with which Mercosur has a "bilateral trade agreement"), the
US represents the most important individual country in terms of trade
volume with Mercosur.
An older agreement with the United States called the "Four Plus One"
has grown substantially in the last five years. Also referred to as
"The Rose Garden", "Four Plus One" agreements was originally signed
in 1991 to provide the US and Mercosur members with a structures within
which to negotiate reciprocal trade and investment arrangements. Specifically,
it provides the US with the means to negotiate with Mercosur members
collectively rather than having to negotiate with each country individually,
while it also allows the members of Mercosur to speak with a more powerful
united voice. (Hinkelman, 1996)
It is in this south American region that the US companies will have
the greatest opportunities for both investment and wider trade relations.
(Campbell, 1998)
Mercosur's long term goals are as follows:
* Harmonization of legislation, tax structure, commercial practices,
tariff structure, and standards for quality and production.
* Disappearance of protection for certain companies, subsidies, monopolies
and market shares.
* Increase of market potential, competition, employment, productivity,
consumer demands, regional enterprise initiations and extra-territory
investment flows.
The agreement will allow for free movement of goods, services, and
factors of production (including capital, labor and natural resources)
among member countries upon fulfillment of the long-term goals of the
agreement. Currently it establishes a CET (Common External Tariff) to
third countries. Mercosur's governing body is the Common Market Council,
composed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy of each member
state. The Executive Body of Mercosur is the Common Market Group composed
of sixteen members representing Ministers of Foreign Affairs; of Economy
and Central Banks. The Common Market Group has a permanent Secretariat
based in Montevideo (Uruguay) and eleven working groups dealing with
sectarian policies. The Mercosur Trade Commission overlooks the implementation
of the CET and Mercosur Trade Policy. (Decker, 1997)
It is imperative to point out that Mercosur is still far from being
a "true common market", but the members have managed to achieve a customs
union and continue negotiations aimed at full common market status by
2006.
The current priorities of Mercosur are as follows: first, to maintain
what was already arranged; second, to deepen the agreements in terms
of new economic sectors, third: to advance in the external front at
a regional level; and fourth to participate in hemispheric and international
initiatives with similar regional trade markets.
To maintain the agreements already obtained is a daily exercise. Frequently
new restrictions appear that have to be discussed and overcome. This
appears to reflect that increasing commerce and at greater trade volume
can lead to a greater quantity of possible conflicts.
Originally, in the case of Mercosur, a period of transition was established,
as from the date of the execution of the agreement (December 31st 1994),
in which the member countries set up a Program of Trade Liberalization,
whereby tariffs levied on trade within the bloc would be linearly and
automatically reduced. In this way, as of December 31, 1994, all goods
that originated in Mercosur would be free from tariffs with non-tariff
restrictions upon them, and presumably if they were traded within Mercosur.
In practice, the first stage of economic integration was an imperfect
free trade association. The four countries made lists of goods, which
were not affected by tariff preferences because they were being considered
sensitive to competition. Year by year, those lists were reduced and,
on January 1, 1995 a 100 percent of liberalization was obtained for
the whole universe of tariffs that affected the goods originated in
Mercosur. The only exception was a list of products filed by each country
within the system of final adequacy to customs union (Decker, 1997)
The concepts of inter-zone and extra-zone trade must be differentiated
to distinguish the first stage of trade liberalization from the second.
Inter-zone trade means trade developed exclusively within the
limits of the bloc, that is to say, trade which involves the member
countries only. On the other hand, Extra-Zone trade refers to
that between the bloc and the rest of the world, that is to say, commercial
transactions performed between any of the member countries and the rest
of the world (Carlsson, 1997)
Therefore, the first stage of integration, the free trade association,
involved only inter-zone trade, without affecting the tariff level that
each country in the Mercosur maintains with the rest of the world. In
order to reach the Customs Union stage in Mercosur as of 1995, each
of the member countries had to replace their own particular tariff structure.
An extra-zone common tariff structure was adopted by the four countries,
which meant that the protection level upon the imports from the rest
of the world would be the same for all the countries in the Mercosur.
The existence of a CET (Common External Tariff would prevent leakage
of products that could be imported through the country that offered
the lower tariff protection, this becoming a place for goods in transit
to be sent to a further destination.
During 1994, a variety of events took place which led to greater regional
economic integration across the world. On January 1, NAFTA (North American
Free Trade Agreement) signed by Mexico, US and Canada was put into force.
Also, the agreements reached by the Summit of Presidents -held in Miami
on December 1994- which put negotiations into motion to set up a continental
free trade zone in the year 2005, represented a new step towards Inter-American
integration.
A regional undertaking of major importance blossomed in 1994: the leaders
of the main countries adjacent to the Pacific Ocean created APEC (Asian
Pacific Economic Cooperation). This group included several economically
powerful countries led by the US, Japan and China. In South America,
the process of Mercosur was consolidated by the agreements reached
in Ouro Preto on December 1994, which ensured the enforcement of a Free
Trade Zone (FTZ) and a Customs Union among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay as of January 1, 1995.
Although this is a matter of considerable debate, "regional agreements"
(like NAFTA, and Mercosur) generally are not devised to foster internal
free trade on the one hand and protectionism towards the rest of the
world on the other. On the contrary, agreements among blocs tend to
be achieved, which then accelerate the globalization of the world trade.
In other words, "open" regionalism may be understood as a "non-multilateral"
means of advancing towards a more open international trade system. (Ribeiro,
1997)
Basically, this view of regionalism may be construed as an integration
process which neither builds walls nor intends to become a fortress,
isolated from the rest of the world. This is the concept which inspired
the "founders" of Mercosur and continues to inspire those concerned
with its further development. (Decker, 1997)
A clear indication of this is the fact that only eighteen months after
the setting up of the Customs Union, Mercosur concluded its first NonMercosur
free trade agreement, in this case with Chile. This country and Bolivia
have since signed free trade association agreements with Mercosur. Negotiations
aimed at achieving a similar agreement with the Andean Pact countries
(Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) will soon follow. Mercosur is also
participating as a bloc in the Free Trade Area of the Americas hemispheric
integration negotiations (FTAA).
In a very significant step, on December 22nd 1994 a Joint Declaration
between the EU Council and the Mercosur member countries was made known,
in which the interest in establishing an inter-regional political and
economic association was remarked. Two negotiations carried out in September,
in Brussels, and in October, in Montevideo, ended up with the signing
in Madrid on December 15th 1995, of the inter-regional Framework Agreement
of Cooperation between the EU and Mercosur. This model for negotiation
of a trade pact became this way the first agreement entered into by
two regional systems of integration, opening doors to the future creation
of an economic space with 580 million consumers, and as an answer to
the importance of the trading exchange between both blocs and to the
great amount of European investments in Mercosur. When the pact becomes
officially signed in 1999, it will establish joint cooperation mechanisms
with regards to customs for the inter-regional trade with the aim of
completely freeing it by the year 2008. (Hoke, 1997)
In this respect, it is important to point out that, in addition to
any trade benefits which may be derived from regional trade agreements,
the latter imply (to a greater or lesser degree) the partial or total
elimination of tariff preferences received at a given time within the
Mercosur framework. This phenomenon would not be imaginable in the case
of a regional trade agreement which aimed at the discrimination of third
parties or in which the development of the regional market were "a purpose
in itself' (Devlin, 1997)
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements clearly in evidence
in the international economy in recent years is putting the old ideal
of multilateral liberalization in international trade to the test. However,
the idea that attempting to achieve an open international economy does
not necessarily exclude integration agreements which could even facilitate
its attainment has recently become accepted in both academic and government
circles. (Devlin, 1997)
It is important to understand that, although the interest of those
American firms striving to get into these new markets will be concentrated
on the commercial possibilities of the bloc or region, they, nevertheless,
should specifically take into account the strategic framework offered
by the country that will constitute their basis. Special attention must
be paid to relevant factors such as economic deregulation, legal certainty,
low tax cost and the establishment of clear and simple non-economic
governmental regulations that fit in with international trade dynamics.
Mercosur has a vision of "open regionalism" meaning that it has no
apparent walls (except for CET) and the member nations do not want to
be isolated from the rest of the world. Despite the fact that a significant
portion of Mercosur trade occurs within its boundaries, the agreement
was not conceived primarily as an intra-regional one, nor does
it aim to satisfy the needs of its own population. Rather, Mercosur
is designed to serve two main purposes: opening bigger markets for large
companies operating within the bloc, and creating increased competitiveness
in order to reach markets outside the region. (Ribeiro, 1997)
A clear example of this is that Mercosur, after one and a half years
of the creation of the customs union, concluded its first agreement
of free trade with Chile, hoping to arrive at a similar one with Bolivia
and with the countries of the "Andean Pact". Mercosur also actively
participated in the initiative towards hemispheric integration (ALCA)
and even Mexico (that forms together with the US and Canada in NAFTA)
expressed an interest in being part of Mercosur. The formula to be applied
would be that of "4+1", creating this way a free trade area with a potential
market that would cover almost the whole American continent.
Likewise, Mercosur has begun dialogues with Japan, and India, and with
other countries of the world. Judging by the recent developments (i.e.:
with Chile, Bolivia mentioned previously), the integration process in
Mercosur has made enormous strides and has reached a level of interrelationship
that provides a solid foundation for additional progress in the years
to come. (Omega, 1997).
One of the most interesting phenomena of the Mercosur process is the
fact that from its creation, as an area of preferential trade from 1991
and a customs union from 1995, the volume of its commerce with the world
has increased. That is for the partner countries, Mercosur is not an
"end in itself", but on the contrary it is a tool to be inserted
in world trade. (Hinkelman, 1996). This notion of Mercosur as a useful
pathway for increased international trade is a question I will address
more specifically in my research. Mercosur's regional trade with the
rest of the world has increased by 74.3% (from 1990-1995) in comparison
to the NAFTA's 21% and EU's 31.7% growth rate during that same five
year period.
Mercosur's ever growing role in global trade is evident by the recent
October 1997 signing of the Mercosur-Chile Free Trade Zone Agreement
between Mercosur and Chile was created. This implies the institutionalization
of an economic trade relation that was naturally growing since the beginning
of the decade at a rate of over 4.6% annually. (Decker, 1997). Because
the Chilean economy has an important international prestige, its incorporation
into Mercosur as an associate member can be considered as a "quality
seal" and a positive sign. Chile may indeed represent Mercosur's gateway
into the Pacific markets due to its geographic location (which makes
it a natural bridge to the Pacific Rim) and its close trade ties and
past commitment in commerce with Southeast Asia.
The importance of Mercosur for the United States is reflected by the
fact that more than 55 percent of its exports to South America are concentrated
in the four Mercosur countries. But without a doubt Mercosur's greatest
impact has been the extraordinary growth in trade and investment for
its two biggest members, Argentina and Brazil. Between 1986 and 1990
the region's share of Argentina's total trade remained around 14.3%.
Regional trade began to grow rapidly in 1991 with an increase of its
share in total Argentine trade from 18.7% in 1991 to 26.5% in 1994 and
to 28% during the first six months of 1995. (Hoopes, 1996).

Argentina not only has reversed the poor economic performance evidenced
during the past decade, but during the 90's its economic improvement
(through membership in Mercosur) has been one of the most successful
of Western nations. (Campbell, 1997). Considering variables such as
the increasing GDP, the investment rate and specially foreign trade,
the current results indicate a prosperous period of growth for this
country. (Decker, 1996) But before embarking on a more in depth analysis
of the nation's present economic conditions, it is necessary to understand
its overall role it has within Mercosur in terms of regional trade with
the member nations.
Between 1986 and 1990, the region's share of Argentina's total trade
remained around 14,3%. However, as Mercosur evolved in both strength
and stability, regional trade began to grow rapidly in 1991 with an
increase of its share in total Argentine trade from 18,7% in 1991 to
26,5% in 1994 and to 28% during the first six months of 1995. During
1996, this figure jumped to 31% and has remained here through most of
1997.
Figure 4
ARGENTINA'S TRADE WITH MERCOSUR
Mercosur's % of Total Argentine Trade

Source: Madigan, 1998
Presently, Argentina's trade with Mercosur nations represents approximately
31% of Argentina's trade with the world. The structure of imports to
its neighbors is representative to that of the rest of the world's.
Intermediate goods (33%) constitute the greater volume in imports, followed
by consumption goods (21%), then capital goods (20%), parts and accessories
for capital goods (18%), passenger vehicles (5%), and fuel (3%).
Figure 4(a)
STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS
(1996)

Source: Ministry of Economy Report, 1997
Argentine exports to the Mercosur nations is comprised of primary products:
28% (including cereals, unprocessed vegetables, legumes, fresh fruits,
livestock, etc), manufactures of farming origin or MFO: 37% (leather
and furs, edible oils and fat, dairy products, processed fish and seafood),
manufactures of industrial origin or MIO: 30% (transport material, machinery
an electric equipment, related chemical products, textiles and clothing,
artificial plastic material), fuel and energy: 5%.
Figure 4(b)
STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS
Source: Ministry of Economy report, 1997
Within the framework of Mercosur, Argentina is consolidating two main
principles to guarantee the sustained development and the welfare of
its citizens: the politics rationality and the economic rationality.
These principles (which will be discussed in greater detail later on
in the paper) have led to overall stability evident in
1. Convertibility Law: Argentina's 1991 law fixed the exchange
rate parity against the US dollar and provided that it could not be
changed with the approval of the Congress. As under a monetary system
called a "currency board", the Law also provided that the monetary base
had to be backed by foreign reserves. This prevents the central bank
from discretionary issuance of money, such as for financing a budget
deficit, and ensures a firm limit to the growth of the money supply.
2. Price Stability: achieved through drastic reduction in inflation
figures.
3. Argentina's growing importance and key role within Mercosur:
the emerging role of Argentina at the head front of the Mercosur union
is becoming more clear through current economic indicators and socio-political
stability in the region.
4. Privatization of Public Enterprises
5. Fiscal Balance through reduction of trade deficit
6. Environmental Protection
7. New Investment Legislation and Tax Reforms
8. Nuclear Non Proliferation agreements
Argentina's exports have increased between 1989 and 1995 at annual
accumulative rate average of almost 14% (placing it among the highest,
as far as growth is concerned, in the world).
The success of the convertibility plan with regard to anti-inflationary
incentives (thus resulting in a dramatic decrease of inflation rate
in past years), allows Argentina to be among the nations with the lowest
inflation rates in the world. Two of the main achievements Argentina
has obtained in the last few years are credibility and certain economic
recovery, especially in the exchange market and in commercial issues.
In this sense, the notable decline in country risk since 1991 enabled
the state and private sector to finance themselves better in the international
capital markets (Hoopes, 1996)
Table 5
| |
EXPORTS
GROWTH RATE
|
TRADE
GROWTH RATE
|
|
COUNTRIES
|
(Annual Average Cumulative Rate:
1989-1995)
|
(Annual Average Cumulative
Rate: 1989-1995)
|
| CHINA |
19% |
20% |
| OTHER ASIAN NICs |
16% |
16.70% |
| ARGENTINA |
13.90% |
16.40% |
| MEXICO |
13.20% |
13.60% |
| CHILE |
12.10% |
13.20% |
| EUROPEAN UNION |
9.10% |
10.10% |
| UNITED STATES |
8.20% |
8.30% |
| BRAZIL |
6.10% |
6.90% |
| REST OF WORLD |
9.20% |
9.10% |
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook (40th Edition)
All these factors have generated an environment of wider credibility
and farsightedness. This greater confidence makes possible the performance
of a major number of productive projects that were not possible before
for the high risk rates. With democracy and economic stability the possibilities
to obtain a positive and convenient interaction with the rest of the
world is decisively increased.

During much of its modern history, Argentina has focused on the export
of primary commodity agricultural products and the import of manufactured,
high-value-added goods. This pattern was altered during the 1940's and
1950's with the advent of protective tariff and non-tariff barriers,
imposed to allow the development of domestic import substitution industries.
For most of the 1960's through the 1980's, Argentina's national policy
shifted back and forth between an open and a closed regime, to the detriment
of both foreign and domestic interests. (Hinkelman, 1996)
After amassing large trade surpluses for most of the 1980's, during
which time the government discouraged imports in an attempt to stabilize
Argentina's finances, policy makers shifted again. In 1989 they adopted
an open-market approach, allowing the economy to run up substantial
trade deficits while encouraging the import of capital goods and other
inputs to strengthen domestic production. While this deregulation enabled
Argentine industries more access to the equipment needed to upgrade
production, it also unfortunately hurt many local industries that were
unable to compete with foreign goods that flooded the domestic market.
This was particularly true for manufacturers of consumer goods. Although
roughly 20% (US$4.41bn) of total imports (US$21.544bn) still consist
of consumer goods (Hinkelman, 1996)--despite high import duties designed
to restrict such trade in nonessentials-- the vast bulk of imports are
now made up of capital goods, parts for such goods, and intermediate
inputs.
The Argentines in general remain somewhat distressed that the payoff
in terms of higher-value-added exports has yet to be realized from allowing
this import-driven trade deficit to swell. Nevertheless, the trend is
positive, especially in comparison with the past, when imports were
predominantly for industrial inputs and domestic consumption. The current
surge in investment in Argentina's industry should begin to show greater
long term results by the year 2000.
In line with its open market policy, the Argentine government reduced
and eliminated many previous existing barriers to international trade,
resulting in the doubling of foreign trade between 1980 and 1996. The
maximum import tariff was cut by more than half, from 50 to 20 percent,
and the 15 percent surcharge (which constituted a minimum charge) was
fully eliminated, allowing some goods to enter duty free. In 1989 the
average tariff was 39 percent; just five years later in January 1994
the average tariff had fallen to 9.1 percent (Hoopes, 1996).
Today the tariffs on almost all imports have fallen even further, and
as a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
Argentina has pledged to reduce them even more. Discretionary import
licensing, which had served to strictly limit imports in the past, was
also dropped. At the same time, the administration also eliminated most
export tariffs and implemented a drawback system to rebate tariffs on
inputs for products destined for export. Between 1980 and 1995, foreign
trade grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of nearly 5 percent
(Hoopes 1996).
The 1995 inauguration of Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) --a customs
union consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay that allows
preferential trade to occur among these partners-- has dramatically
altered the trade situation for Argentina. Preferential trade among
Mercosur began in 1991, and free trade went into effect in 1995. Argentina's
1993 trade with its Mercosur partners rose by nearly 30 percent (from
the previous two years), and has steadily grown. Although Argentina
currently maintains a trade deficit with these nations, its exports
to them are also rising sharply. As the full provisions of the agreement
take effect, the mutual benefits among all the trading partners are
expected to continue to multiply.
After taking a large downfall in the 1980's, Argentina's total foreign
trade has more than tripled in the past ten years, rising roughly from
US$11.6 billion in 1986 to approximately US$40 billion in 1996. During
these same years, the share of Argentina's gross domestic product (GDP)
representing foreign trade has remained nearly level at an average of
12.5 percent. (De la Balze, 1996)
This indicates that domestic production and foreign trade have been
expanding at close to the same pace. The relative proportion of foreign
trade to the total economy also graphically points up that the Argentine
economy continues to be largely oriented toward the domestic sphere:
more than 85 percent of the economy is focused on domestic markets.
While the share of foreign trade relative to the economy appears to
be growing, the overall proportional increase has been slight. Nevertheless,
the focus is currently export production.
In relation to other countries trading in world markets, the percentage
of Argentina's GDP represented by foreign trade is fairly low. For example,
in 1992 the following countries registered levels of foreign trade relative
to their GDP's higher than the 11.8 percent registered by Argentina.
Table 6
FOREIGN TRADE RELATIVE TO GDP
| COUNTRY |
% GDP REPRESENTED
BY FOREIGN TRADE |
| Brazil |
15% |
| Mexico |
23.4% (37.3% with maquila trade) |
| Japan |
15.20% |
| China |
40.20% |
|
Taiwan
|
76.90%
|
|
United States
|
17.50%
|
|
Great Britain
|
43.80%
|
|
France
|
46. 20%
|
|
Germany
|
60%
|
|
Argentina
|
11.84%
|
Source: de la Baize (1996)
All these numbers point to the fact that Argentina continues to concentrate
on its domestic markets to a greater extent than many other countries
with more developed or rapidly expanding economies.
The emphasis on domestic markets in Argentina is a function of two
factors or variables:
Argentina's economy is still relatively undeveloped when compared
with the more developed economies of such nations as European Union
(EU) members like the UK, France and Germany, which depend on foreign
trade for a much greater proportion of their overall economic activity.
Argentina's proportionally large and important domestic markets
constitute the core of its economy, as is also the situation in Brazil,
the US, and Japan. Many domestic producers are just starting to enter
the international trade sector, and it is a slow process because many
of these producers need to invest heavily in imported capital goods
and intermediate inputs to upgrade their production capabilities. The
process is made even more difficult because the opening of Argentina's
markets to increase the availability of those imports has also intensified
the competition at home. Thus, domestic producers are having to become
more competitive not only in international markets, but simultaneously
in Argentine markets. (Carlsson, 1997)
Prior to 1989 Argentina's markets were for the most part closed to
imports, while exports were highly concentrated in a few sectors. When
open markets were implemented, foreign trade performed as might be expected
--that is, it surged rapidly. The overall numbers also camouflage a
significant differential in the rate of growth of the various trade
components. Imports have more than quadrupled (from US$4.7 billion in
1986 to over US$22 billion in 1996, while exports have more than doubled
(from US$6.8 billion in 1986 to US$16 billion in 1996). This differential
between growth patterns between imports and exports has arisen largely
because of the need to import modern technology before domestic industries
can supply exports in such quantity, quality, and diversity as to become
competitive in global markets. This gap --between imports and exports--
is likely to continue for some time, and narrowing it will require:
- Intensive capital investment
- Modification of the management structure
- Training of the workforce
Many Argentine businesses -and whole industries- are now engaged in
this challenge. Those that find a way to persevere will start to transform
the current trade deficit into a more balanced level of foreign trade.
Until the 1990's exports from Argentina remained at approximately the
same level for decades, although tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports
permitted the country to post trade surpluses until 1981. The products
exported were highly concentrated in three sectors: agriculture, industrial
manufactures, and fuels. From 1980 through 1989 roughly 2/3 of Argentina's
exports continued to be associated with agriculture (primary products
averaged 30 percent; agricultural manufactures --processed and semi
processed-- averaged 37 percent). About 1/5 of exports (21 percent)
during the 1980's were industrial manufactures, consisting mainly of
base metals (iron, steel, aluminum, some machinery, and chemicals).
Only about 4 percent of the exports were fuels and fuel derivatives,
production by the state-run monopoly was designed primarily to fill
domestic need rather than to contribute to export revenues.
The country is still known primarily for its agricultural exports (grain,
oilseeds, and meat products). According to statistics compiled by Argentina's
National Institute of Census Statistics (INDEC) for 1996, exports of
agricultural manufactures fell to a 29 percent share from a 37 percent
share of total exports, while primary (agricultural) products dropped
to a 24 percent share from a 38 percent share --or combined, from nearly
3/4 to about 112. Meanwhile, industrial manufactures rose to a 37 percent
share from a 21 percent in 1996. Fuel exports rose as well, to a 10
percent share from a 4 percent share, but the real story was the surge
in higher-value-added manufactured industrial products.
In 1996 exports were still heavily concentrated in a few sectors, but
diversification was beginning to be visible. In that year INDEC reported
that the top four exports (fuels, fats and oils, food byproducts, and
cereals) together made up 37 percent of total merchandise exports. The
top ten exports represented roughly 70 percent of all exports. Some
of the highest growth in exports in 1996 came from higher-value-added
goods, including transportation equipment (up 25.6%), chemical products
(up 29.5%), and machinery and electrical products (up 13.2%)
For some, the shift in Argentine exports is occurring too slowly. Some
analysts have voiced concern that the growth of non-traditional, higher-value-added
exports needs to be further encouraged if they are going to supply the
foreign exchange that is currently being supplied through foreign investment.
Nevertheless, export rates have been growing steadily since 1992. In
dollar terms, exports took a 3 percent dip in 1991, but then recovered,
growing by 2.1 percent in 1992, by an even stronger 7 percent in 1993,
by 14 percent in 1994, and by 20 percent in 1996. (Hoopes, 1996)
Table 7
ARGENTINE EXPORTS BY CATEGORY 1996
| PRODUCT CATEGORY |
US$BILLION |
PERCENT |
| FUELS |
1.619 |
10.3 |
| FATS AND OILS |
1.533 |
9.7 |
| FOOD BY PRODUCTS |
1.341 |
8.5 |
| CEREALS |
1.323 |
8.4 |
| OILSEEDS |
0.953 |
6.1 |
| MEAT |
0.912 |
5.8 |
| TRANSPORTATION |
0.903 |
5.7 |
| MACHINERY AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT |
0.855 |
5.4 |
| BASE METALS |
0.786 |
5.1 |
| HIDES AND LEATHER |
0.762 |
4.8 |
| CHEMICALS |
0.724 |
4.6 |
| SEAFOOD (FRESH) |
0.441 |
2.8 |
| SEAFOOD (PROCESSED) |
0.278 |
1.8 |
| VEGETABLES (FRESH) |
0.254 |
1.6 |
| MINERAL PRODUCTS |
0.25 |
1.6 |
| OTHER MISCELLANEOUS |
2.805 |
17.8 |
| TOTAL |
15.739 |
100 |
Source: INDEC, 1996
Argentina has become a hot market for imports. Imports grew by 20-fold
between 1965 and 1996, but the major growth has only been since 1991
when the more open policies of the Menem government began to go into
effect. During much of the 1980's, the nation discouraged products from
abroad, but Argentina is continuing to open its markets, reduce tariffs,
deregulate government monopolies, and stabilize its exchange rate (currently
pegged to the US Dollar). End user demand is high for both consumer
and industrial goods.
As mentioned before, imports of capital goods, intermediate products,
and parts and accessories represented 72.5 percent of imports by economic
utilization category in 1996. In another listing by more specific categories,
it was shown that machinery and electronic equipment represented the
largest category of imports in 1996, accounting for 34 percent of all
imports (up 27 percent from the previous year). Imports of transportation
equipment ranked second at 18 percent (up 43 percent), indicating the
strength of the Argentine automotive industry, because much of this
tariff represents trade in components with Brazil. Chemicals represented
the third largest category with a 12 percent share of total merchandise
imports (up 28 percent). Together these three categories accounted for
nearly 2/3 of Argentina's 1996 imports, as well as for all imports categories
representing more than US$ 2 billion and 14 percent of the total. The
top ten import categories account for 92 percent of all imports.
Table 8
ARGENTINE IMPORTS BY CATEGORY
1996
| PRODUCT CATEGORY |
US$BILLION |
PERCENTAGE |
| MACHINERY AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT |
7.415 |
34.4 |
| TRANSPORTATION |
3.834 |
17. 8 |
| CHEMICALS |
2.577 |
12 |
| BASE METALS |
1.272 |
5.9 |
| PLASTICS |
1.113 |
5.2 |
| TEXTILE PRODUCTS |
0.828 |
3.8 |
| MINERAL PRODUCTS |
0.801 |
3.7 |
| PRECISION INSTRUMENTS |
0.708 |
3.3 |
| PAPER PRODUCTS |
0.694 |
3.2 |
| FOOD PRODUCTS |
0.593 |
2.8 |
| PLANT PRODUCTS |
0.343 |
1.6 |
| LIVE ANIMALS |
0.251 |
1.2 |
| CEMENT AND GLASS |
0.226 |
1 |
| OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS |
0.889 |
4.1 |
| TOTAL |
21.544 |
100 |
Source: INDEC, 1996
Argentina's dominant trade partner is its largest neighbor, Brazil.
Brazil achieved this standing in 1992 and has retained it every year
since then. In 1996 Brazil accounted for US$ 7.875 billion (21.1 percent)
of Argentina's total trade. The nation's second largest partner is the
United States, with US$ 6.645 billion (17.8 percent) of total trade.
Argentina conducts almost 39 percent of its trade with these two countries
alone.
Aside from the two largest trading partners, eight other nations had
trade with Argentina greater than US$ 1 billion in value in 1996. Individually
their share of total foreign trade ranged from 5.5 percent to 2.9 percent,
falling substantially below those of the top two partners. In order
of their ranking these are:
Table 9
ARGENTINA'S TOP TRADING PARTNERS
1996
| COUNTRY |
TOTAL [US$ BILLION] |
| BRAZIL |
7.875 |
| UNITED STATES |
6.645 |
| ITALY |
2.069 |
| GERMANY |
1.988 |
| CHILE |
1.812 |
| THE NETHERLANDS |
1.528 |
| SPAIN |
1.442 |
| URUGUAY |
1.43 |
| FRANCE |
1.286 |
| JAPAN |
1.071 |
Source: Cooper, 1998
When foreign trade with these eight traders is combined with the two
top partners, the top ten trade partners account for almost 73 percent
of Argentina's trade. Argentina's trade relationships with its neighboring
countries have been significantly affected by Mercosur. From 1975 to
1989, an average of only about 11 percent of Argentina's total foreign
trade was conducted with Brazil. When the first step of preferential
trade began at the start of the present decade, that figure jumped to
17 percent in 1990, and it has been rising steadily ever since. By 1992
Brazil had become Argentina's number one trading partner, and the amount
and proportion of trade between the two countries continues to grow.
To date Brazil has been the major purchaser of Argentina's new, non
traditional, higher-value-added exports.
During the past 30 years, Argentina has maintained a balance of merchandise
trade surplus in all but four years: 1981 and 1992 through 1994. During
many of these years, Argentina actively managed its trade by using tariff
and other barriers to artificially exclude imports. When open-market
policies were introduced, imports began to outpace exports, causing
deficits in the early 1990's. Based on improved export performance in
early 1995 and 1996, officials have projected break-even performance,
or perhaps even a slight surplus by the end of the decade. (Fidler,
1997). To regain its trade surplus, the country is focusing on diversifying
its exports, stepping up production of high-valued added goods, and
trading with its Mercosur partners.
Argentina's current accounts have been in deficit in 20 of the past
30 years, most recently showing a surplus only in 1990. In addition
to merchandise trade, the current account deficit includes trade in
invisibles (services), investment payments, and transfers. Argentina
has generally maintained a deficit position in trade in services, and
has historically paid out more investment income than it has received,
keeping its finances on edge. Countries that generate substantial amounts
of inbound investment and a high rate of growth in the domestic economy
can sustain such disparities, but imbalances in current accounts pose
more than the usual danger for Argentina, because its domestic economy
could still be hurt by the loss of the outside funds.
Thus the development of exports, especially non traditional ones, is
taking on greater urgency. In 1996 non traditional industrial products
accounted for 40% of the growth in exports. In comparison, 40% of the
increase in imports consisted of capital goods, which in turn are being
used to increase productivity. Argentines point out that their current
account deficit in 1996 was only 4% of its GDP, barely half the level
of Mexico's deficit when it got into trouble at the end of that year.
(Carlsson, 1997).
As Argentines focus more and more on opportunities within Mercosur,
the balance of trade situation is indicative of trends. Trade with Mercosur
members posted a deficit of US$ 1.428 billion in 1995; however, this
was reduced to US$ 530 million in 1996, and US$ 389 million in 1997.
(Warn, 1998).
The wide ranging reform programs introduced back in 1989 have effected
drastic changes in an economy that had reached an acute crisis stage
in the late 1980's. Most of the statist controls imposed during prior
decades have been fully removed, deregulation and restructuring of public
and private sectors is well underway, and industries are being privatized.
Argentina has adopted outward -looking trade policies in this early
phase of economic recovery.
Even with the government's adoption of open market trade policies,
the process of becoming internationally competitive is proving to be
somewhat slow, yet certain. There is a great need to reform industry,
management, and labor structures. Open market policies have not eliminated
the issues that Argentine businesses face in producing goods that can
compete in both domestic and international markets. As a result, imports
are likely to remain high for some time in order to meet domestic consumer
demand, industrial investment in capital goods, and consumption of intermediate
inputs for re-export production. However, it is in this situation that
US businesses can seek to maximize their opportunities. The rising consumer
demand in these areas, represents unchartered waters for potential growth
in which American companies can derive the most benefit. (Decker, 1997)
The government has committed itself with its open trade policies for
he most part, allowing for a transitional period only when protection
of an important industry becomes necessary for its survival. Nearly
barriers to exports have been eliminated, and exports have been showing
an increased growth rate --growth was particularly strong during the
first six months of 1996-- although growth has nevertheless been comparatively
gradual and occurs from a relatively low base level. (Carlsson, 1997).
Observers argue that 1996 has been the turning point for Argentina's
exports. First, some see the domestic market as nearly saturated for
a wide range of goods, even without the negative effects of the emerging
markets downturn in early 1996 which have served to depress imports.
Second, and more positively, the effects of investment appear to be
greatly more noticeable: Argentine manufacturing activity --up by 15%
in 1996 from 1995-- increased for the 21 st consecutive quarter in the
first quarter of 1996. (Fidler, 1997). Also, the fixture years promise
to be a record period for harvests of agricultural products, while international
demand seems to be either growing or at least stable for the intermediate
products that form the bulk of Argentina's exports.
The Argentine government is seeking to improve trading relationships
and increase export access regionally -culminating in bilateral trade
agreements and in the Mercosur pact -and on a global scale through GATT,
potential ties with EU, and the future hemispheric free trade area of
the Americas (FTAA).

Leading Foreign
Investors: The main sources of foreign investment in Argentina
are the US, Europe, and its closest Latin American neighbors, Chile
and Brazil. The US has been the leading foreign investor in Argentina,
topping the list in 1991 through 1994; US investors' share of the country's
total foreign investment over the past four years was more than 40 percent.
Much of that participation has been in the form of the purchase of privatized
assets (primarily infrastructure assets), with the next most prevalent
form representing capital investments in the consumer products, and
automotive industries.
Table 10
U.S FINANCIAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN ARGENTINA
(US$ millions)
| YEAR |
PUBLIC SECTOR BONDS |
SHARES AND CB |
TOTAL INVESTMENTS |
| 1992 |
853
|
1.148
|
2.001
|
| 1993 |
7512
|
10470
|
17982
|
| 1994 |
10127
|
13963
|
24090
|
| 1995 |
5574
|
9207
|
14881
|
| 1996 |
7648
|
12730
|
20378
|
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
1997.
Table 11
US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN ARGENTINA
(US$ millions)
|
PERIOD
|
POSITION
(US$ MILLIONS)
|
|
1974 - 1978
|
6818
|
|
1979 - 1983
|
12930
|
|
1984 - 1988
|
13338
|
|
1989 - 1993
|
15331
|
|
1994 - 1996
|
22426
|
|
TOTAL
|
70,843
|
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. US Department of Commerce,
1997.
Other principal foreign investors include those from Italy, Spain,
France, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Canada.
As noted, backing the overall foreign investment trend are bilateral
agreements between Argentina and various countries, primarily those
from Europe and the Americas. Typically, these bilateral trade agreements
establish a government-to-government framework for channeling private
investment and official financing and guarantees between firms from
the participating nations. They also usually provide for international
arbitration of investment disputes and grant foreign investors protection
from uncompensated expropriation and full capita) repatriation rights
(even in the event of a currency crisis). The agreements and new reforms
have gone a long way toward reducing Argentine sovereign risk for all
investors, not just those covered under bilateral national agreements.
Sources of foreign capital are expected to diversify in the wake of
the continued expansion of free market reforms around the world. Argentina's
rich natural resource wealth, relatively high national income, open
market economic policy, and historical international bent should continue
to make it attractive to foreign capital in the years to come.
Based on announced projects scheduled for completion between 1994 and
2000, the US should remain the major investor in Argentina, being involved
in 35 projects and 5 additional joint ventures with Argentine or third
country firms. French firms are participating in 7 projects plus 4 multinational
joint ventures; UK firms in 7, plus 3 joint ventures; and German firms
in 7, plus 1 joint venture. Other investors include Chileans (6 projects
and 3 joint ventures); Canadians (4 and 2); Italians (4 and 2); Japanese
(2 and 1); Mexican (2 and 1); Dutch (2 and 1); Brazilian (2 and 1);
Swiss (2 projects); Australian (1 project and 1 joint venture); and
the Irish and Venezuelans with 1 project each.
Historical Perspective At the beginning of the 20th century, Argentina
was a liberal democracy with the tenth largest economy and the sixth
highest per capita income in the world. Its abundant natural resources,
coupled with some of the best agricultural land in the world, attracted
immigrants and development capital from around the globe. Indeed, these
factors --together with a largely middle class population of European
ancestry --made for a welcome and attractive environment for direct
foreign investment. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries foreign
investors, primarily from the US and the UK, rushed in to develop first
infrastructure --ports, railways, and electric power and natural gas
production and distribution facilities-- and later manufacturing operations.
For 1880 to 1930 the nation flourished with a stable currency tied
to a gold standard and an annual average inflation rate of only 1.5
percent; between 1900 and 1920 gross domestic product (GDP) doubled.
Moderate protectionism began to develop during the period of World W |