THE DILEMMAS OF FISCAL POLICY MAKING IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1978-1996
by
Seidia Roach©
Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors of Baruch College,
City University of New York, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Honors
Faculty Advisor: Professor Alan DiGaetano
Introduction
Theoretical
Perspectives On Urban Fiscal Policy Making
An Economic
Theory Of Urban Fiscal Policy Making
The Politics
Of Urban Fiscal Policy Making
New York City Fiscal Policy:
1978-1993
The Economics Of
Fiscal Policy
City Revenues And The
Economy
The Politics Of Fiscal
Policy
Notes
Bibliography

The central purpose of this thesis is to identify the crucial factors
that influence fiscal policy making in New York City. Since the city's
brush with fiscal crisis in 1975, financial worries and problems have
plagued New York's municipal leaders. The most commonly proffered explanations
for how New York City has managed its fiscal difficulties in the last
two decades either emphasize the importance of economic factors or the
role of politics in shaping the city's fiscal policy making. Although
there are elements of truth in each of these theoretical approaches
to New York City's fiscal decision making process, neither adequately
or wholly accounts for the patterns of revenues and expenditures since
the fiscal crisis. The aim of this essay is to determine the relative
importance of economic and political factors in New York City fiscal
policy making. Specifically, by analyzing fiscal policy making from
1978 to 1996, this paper attempts to discern the extent to which the
city's fiscal policies are a consequence of the performance of the local
economy and/or the politics of mayoral coalition building.
The mayoral administrations of Edward Koch and Rudolph Giuliani have
been selected for this study because of the sharply different economic
climates in which each operated. The Koch administration coped with
the aftermath of the 1975 fiscal crisis and then enjoyed the fruits
of the more prosperous mid-to-late 1980s. The Giuliani administration,
in contrast, has struggled with a stubbornly stagnant local economy.
This comparison, then, will enable us to track the effects of the business
cycle on fiscal policy making in New York City. Also, mayors Koch and
Giuliani built conservative political coalitions, and a comparison of
the two administrations will also allow us to assess the extent to which
their administrations were able to reward their constituencies in periods
of boom and bust.
This paper seeks to explain how New York City has managed the difficulties
of fiscal policy since the late 1970s. The first section discusses the
different schools of thought on urban fiscal policy-making. The second
provides some background on New York City's fiscal policies since the
1975 fiscal crisis. Part three examines the importance of the economy
in shaping the New York City fiscal decision-making process. Here, the
mayoral administrations of Edward Koch and Rudolph Giuliani are compared
to demonstrate how the performance of the local economy has set parameters
for fiscal policy-making. Again, comparing the Koch and the Giuliani
mayoral administrations, the fourth section focuses on the political
dimension of fiscal policy making, The conclusion draws the various
strands of explanation together by assessing how the New York City case
helps us to understand the relative importance of economic and political
factors in the process of urban fiscal policy making.

The fiscal troubles of American cities, according to David Stanley,
can be divided into three broad categories: fiscal crisis, long-term
decline and fiscal distress. (1)
He defines fiscal crisis as the dramatic, immediate problem that
occurs when a city has neither cash nor credit to meet near-term expenses,
such as payroll and supplies. Fiscal crisis then, according to Stanley,
is the extreme condition of bankruptcy or near bankruptcy. Secondly,
long-term decline is a situation in which a deteriorating local
economy and social conditions erode a city's tax base. Finally, fiscal
distress entails the everyday struggle of even the most affluent
of communities to balance their budget without raising taxes or cutting
services. Although Stanley's definition of fiscal distress implies that
the fiscal problems of many cities may have been poorly diagnosed, it
also indicates that urban fiscal troubles, in whatever form, are a recurrent
feature of American city politics.
Two competing theories claim to explain the reasons why cities often
experience financial problems--the economic approach and the political
approach. What follows is a discussion of the basic elements of each
approach and how each explains chronic structural imbalances in municipal
budgets.

Paul Peterson, in his book City Limits, interprets fiscal policy
making as a function of local autonomy. (2)
Local autonomy refers to the degree of discretion that a local government
exercises over local affairs. Peterson argues that the fiscal problems
of cities are largely determined by external forces beyond the control
of local government. That is, Peterson holds that local governments
are constrained by a number of factors, legal and otherwise, that serve
to limit their autonomy, making "city politics, limited politics."
(3) Not only is a municipal
government's legal autonomy limited, but within this institutional arrangement,
external factors, particularly economic ones, constrain the decisions
municipal leaders are able to make.
Peterson construes economic interests as the primary or 'unitary' interests
of a city. (4) A city's economic
well-being is defined as a condition of relative economic prosperity
that cities seek to attain. Cities constantly seek to maintain or improve
their economic position in the national and international system of
cities. To compete effectively, local governments must pursue policies
that enhance a city's ability to attract labor and capital. Development
policies, which provide necessary infrastructure and services, enhance
the economic position of a city. In contrast, redistributive policies,
which transfer benefits to low-income residents, adversely affect a
city's economic standing.
Peterson argues that because a city's economic position varies relative
to the larger national socioeconomic trends, "the place of the
city within the larger political economy of the nation fundamentally
affects the policy choices that cities can make. (5)
Cities are not autonomous in the policies they can execute because economic
prosperity is contingent upon the performance of the national economy.
In short, constrained by factors beyond their control, local policy
makers operate within a limited sphere of influence.
According to Peterson, general consensus usually forms around development
policies because these programs strengthen the local economy, and thus
increase a city's competitiveness relative to other cities. A stronger
local economy, in turn, enlarges the local tax base and generates additional
resources that can be used for a community's welfare. In addition to
producing economic benefits, developmental policies can nm the gamut
from being totally self-financing (such as user fees), to those that
demand a sacrifice (such as tax concessions and abatements to businesses),
which means "paying for themselves in the long run."(6)
Redistributive policies, in contrast, seek to transfer benefits from
higher to lower income segments of the population through social services,
which adversely affects a city's economic position. That is, redistributive
programs prove fiscally burdensome to municipalities to maintain, supplying
benefits to those least needed by the local economy, but financed by
those who are most needed.
Peterson applied the "city limits" theory to the 1975 fiscal
crisis in New York City. Peterson argues that the New York fiscal crisis
was "externally determined by long range socioeconomic forces and
by national policies that facilitated suburban growth." (7)
For example, Peterson attributes much of the blame for the 1975 fiscal
crisis to federal highway programs that facilitated the exodus of the
middle class to the suburbs and businesses to less costly areas. These
trends, in turn, were exacerbated by New York City's fiscal policy,
which provided generous redistributive programs that were a response
to increasing demands of the poor minority groups, and increased salaries
and benefits of city employees beyond local government's capacity to
pay for them. In other words, socioeconomic trends set the parameters
of fiscal capacity, and politicians managed the city's fiscal problems
within these limits.

A second theoretical approach focuses on the politics of fiscal
policy making. Martin Shelter, in his book Political Crisis/Fiscal
Crisis, claims that New York City's 1975 fiscal crisis was precipitated
by political decisions, not, as Peterson argues, middle-class flight
to the suburbs,deindustrialization, and other large-scale structural
shifts that eroded the city's tax base. Instead, Shelter contends that
fiscal problems arise from the inability of local officials to meet
the most "immediate imperatives" without spending more money
than is collected in taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Shelter
regards the "immediate imperatives" for fiscal policy as the
need to: (1) generate sufficient votes to win elections; (2) maintain
the health of the city's local economy; (3) preserve the city's credit
rating, and (4) maintain social harmony by mediating conflicts among
competing groups. (8)
To explain the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis, Shefter contends that
public officials sought to maintain high levels of expenditure in the
face of an eroding tax base in an effort to serve their constituencies
and thereby retain political power. In his view, politicians or local
officials forge alliances with interest groups on whose support they
depend to remain in office. And they do this by satisfying ever increasing
interest group demands. Rapid increases in municipal expenditures in
the face of declining revenues occur, as a result, when local officials
seek to mobilize or maintain political support or forestall opposition.
Simply put, Shefter explains the rise and fall of municipal expenditures
by analyzing how city officials attempt to meet the demands of organized
or, in some cases, disorganized interests. The motivation for politicians
is to win re-election. (9)
Shefter depicts the relationship between city leaders and political
coalitions as dynamic and dialectical. The process of bargaining and
compromise between municipal leaders and their political coalitions
is the critical factor in fiscal policy. Shefter distinguishes between
two types of interests in fiscal politics: "the service demanders
and the money providers." (10)
Typically, the money providers include homeowners, small businessmen,
real estate interests, bankers, and other economic and business interests.
Service demanders, in turn, are the poor, ethnic and racial minorities
who are often politically less powerful. These two coalitions compete
for influence in local government and, according to Shelter, the choices
public officials make may win them the approval or enmity of these electoral
interests. The fiscal choices are, therefore, based decisively on the
calculation of which political interests they can least afford to alienate.
In sum, Shefter suggests that to explain the rapid growth of municipal
budgets and debt, one must analyze the political logic of actions taken
by city officials in response to changes in the city's social and economic
structures. In otherwords, fiscal policy making is a process of highly
contested interest group competition, in which organized interests engage
in power struggles over the level of taxation and the distribution of
municipal expenditures.
Ester Fuchs, in her book Mayors and Money, perceives the urban
fiscal policy making process a little differently. Fuchs considers the
mayor to be both the key fiscal decision-maker and the final arbiter
of budgetary decisions. As the key player, the mayor's ability to gather
support for his/her policies of generating revenue sources and capping
expenditures shape the dynamics of the fiscal policy process. The mayor's
power to centralize and control the budgetary process and limit public
demands are what Fuchs terms the political context for fiscal policy-making.
Fuchs contends that politics and the political context of economic
scarcity are central to understanding the urban fiscal condition. She
identifies five political factors that figure prominently in the fiscal
policy of American cities. They include: (1) long-term budget trends;
(2) local party organization; (3) interest group activity; (4) intergovernmental
relations; and (5) formal legal arrangements. (11)
Although Fuchs recognizes these factors as establishing the context
of fiscal policy making, she emphasizes the role of the mayor as decisive.
Given that the mayor's power is mandated by law, Fuchs argues that the
mayor's actions greatly affect and sometimes determine the degree of
fiscal stability. When one official exerts so much influence over local
fiscal policy making, fiscal stability can be achieved in two critical
ways. First, the mayor can reduce the burden of service delivery to
the city by shifting the responsibility to other governmental jurisdictions.
Second, the mayor can control interest groups by ignoring or resisting
demands for increases in existing services or the provision of new services
that would strain the local revenue base.
Ultimately, according to Fuchs, the mayor possesses the authority and
the political independence to make decisions that shape or reorient
the budgetary process. Unlike other explanations, Fuchs insists that
city leaders retain some degree of control over fiscal decisions and
it is this autonomy, however limited, that helps to explain the process
of urban fiscal policy making.
The remainder of this research paper assesses the political and economic
factors that influenced New York City's fiscal management over the past
two decades. It is argued that economic factors are most important for
explaining revenue related decisions, while politics is of greater importance
in determining the patterns of municipal expenditure. So, it is not
economic or politics that are determinants, but a combination of the
two.

Financial ruin threatened the City of New York in the Spring of 1975.
Carrying a $12.3 billion debt and an operating budget deficit of $1.68
billion, (12) the city
was unable to meet its debt obligations as they fell due or even to
cover operating expenses such as payroll. Moreover, excessive short
term borrowing (between 1971 and 1972 the city issued almost $12 billion
in short term securities) (13)
meant that the city began experiencing difficulties in selling its notes.
Eventually, the city was locked out of the bond market, which precipitated
a cash flow crisis and forced municipal officials to own up to the impending
disaster.
New York's virtual default has been attributed to many causes: a collapsing
private economy, suburbanization, and increased spending on social services,
education and health services. Moreover, New York City may have employed
questionable and imprudent financial practices. For more than a decade,
city expenditures had exceeded revenues, due in part to a growth in
expenditures related to social services for the massive influx of more
than 2 million immigrants. Over this period, the city filled the gap
between revenues and expenditures by resorting to extensive short term
borrowing. That is, the city had engaged in chronic deficit spending
and amassed huge short term and long term debt, a clear indicator of
fiscal danger. The banking community earned substantial profits from
the resale of the city's bonds and therefore conspired in what one observer
called "denigrating the city's fiscal integrity." (14)
Almost when it was too late, the banking community expressed 'deep concern'
over the city's mounting debt and demanded reforms in the city's fiscal
policy. As a consequence, the city was suspended from the municipal
bond market, leaving Mayor Abraham Beame a confused and hapless player
in the drama that was yet to unfold.
On June 10th, 1975, the New York State legislature passed the Municipal
Assistance Corporation Act, which established the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC). The MAC's mission was to restore the City's creditworthiness.
It was authorized to sell bonds to meet the city's borrowing needs.
In addition, to curb the profligate spending habits of New York City
government, the state legislature passed the Financial Emergency Act,
which created a seven member Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB).
The EFCB was charged with the mandate of reorganizing and overseeing
New York City's financial affairs. (15)
These two institutions placed the city into virtual receivership of
its major creditors -- a group of elite bankers and businessmen.
The city's new fiscal overseers imposed a severe austerity program
designed to retrieve the city from imminent financial ruin. Such reforms
included immediate reductions in the municipal workforce, cuts in basic
as well as redistributive services, and postponing capital investments
in the city's infrastructure until 1981. The MAC and EFCB also introduced
several new practices, such as attaching user fee charges to some services
that were heavily subsidized. This included charging tuition at the
City University of New York and raising transit fares.
Under this austerity program, many of the routine operations of the
City were put under direct supervision. The City was required to submit
its contracts for EFCB review and approval. State mandates also required
the City to prepare balanced budgets annually, devise four-year financial
and longterm capital investment plans, and, finally, submit its operating
results for independent audits each year. (16)
These measures formed an integrated financial management system designed
to institute sound financial practices and, most of all, accountability.
It did not take long for economic recovery to return the city to fiscal
stability. In the meantime, the measures imposed by the fiscal monitors
disciplined municipal leaders and instilled a new ethic of fiscal conservatism.
By 1981 the City achieved a balanced budget in accordance with the criteria
of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Also, the EFCB gave
way to a Financial Control Board, which remained an advisory agency
whose former powers could be invoked if the city ended a fiscal year
with a deficit of $100 million or more.(17)
The 1980s proved to be a prosperous decade, not only for New York City,
but for the nation. The city's key industries, finance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE), grew by more than 18 percent. Almost instinctively,
the City responded to economic success with expansionary budget policies.
The municipal operating budget grew by 81 percent or 11 percent in constant
dollars between 1981-1989. (18)
Public sector employment in the city rose by 8 percent, nearly twice
the rate statewide. (19)
The unexpected stock market crash in October 1987, however, signaled
to city leaders that they were not yet clear of financial problems.
In fact, a slow recovery from the crash left the city unprepared for
the recession at the end of the decade.
During this period, Mayor Edward Koch had engaged in a self-defeating
practice of cutting spending in some areas and significantly increasing
expenditures in others, thus causing budget gaps. For example, the city's
contribution to public assistance programs increased exponentially.
This growth continued under the Dinkins administration with Medicaid
spending increasing by nearly 59 percent in constant dollars, while
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Home Relief rose 12 percent
in constant dollars from 1989 to 1992. Moreover, more than half of that
growth occurred during the recessionary period of 1989-1992. (20)
In addition, debt service proved unwieldy. This, in part, was due to
the fact that capital spending had been deferred in the aftermath of
the 1975 crisis. As a result, to pay for much needed infrastructure
investment, the total debt service (including the Municipal Assistance
Corporation and the Water Finance Authority) grew by 95 percent, from
$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1986 to over $2.8 billion in 1993.(21)
Finally, in fiscal year 1989, the Koch administration proposed a budget
that "cares where it counts," employing the guiding principles
of "common sense and compassion." (22)
This budget, however, was laden with financial burdens that hampered
David Dinkin's administration (1989-1993), and threatened to bring the
city once again to the brink of bankruptcy.

As Peterson suggests, the local economy has had a far-reaching and
profound effect on a city's fiscal decision-making process. This has
resulted from the direct link between the state of the local economy
and the amount of municipal revenues collected. When a local economy
expands, generally speaking, the flow of municipal revenues enlarges.
Conversely, during a recession, revenues contract and expenditures that
were affordable during periods of strong economic growth become more
difficult to finance.
This section discusses how the economy sets the parameters of fiscal
policy making by determining the amount of money available for spending.
These "city limits," as Peterson calls them, in turn, influence
the decisions made by municipal leaders in the fiscal policy-making
process.

The composition of a city's revenue base determines, to some extent,
how susceptible the level of municipal income is to changes in the business
cycle. New York City's revenue structure is composed of a complex set
of income streams. Taxes account for most of the city's revenues. These
include property, local sales, local wage, and corporate taxes. Other
sources of municipal income flow from charges or fees derived from various
services provided by the city government. Intergovernmental revenues,
which are transfers of funds from either the federal or state governments,
form the last principal source of city revenues.
One problem concerning municipal finance stems from the relative sensitivity
of a city's revenue base to swings in the economy. The greater the reliance
on a single revenue stream, the more vulnerable a municipality is to
changes in the business cycle. Because of this, municipalities seek
to diversify their revenue base to insulate city budgets from the fiscal
instability caused by fluctuations in the economy. As Fuchs relates,
"If a city's revenue structure is not diversified, then long-term
dependency can develop on one revenue source, increasing the city's
vulnerability to fiscal problems if that source should be reduced."(23)
Property taxes, which are the least sensitive to cyclical fluctuations,
are thus, much more reliable and lend greater stability to a city's
financial base. Elaine Sharp reports that most cities rely heavily on
property tax revenues. (24)
According to her research, cities, on average, receive 37 percent of
their revenues from property taxes, with 25 percent of the cities studied
generating more than fifty percent of their local revenues from this
one source. (25) In fact,
property taxes usually contribute the largest share of revenues to the
municipal coffers, when compared to other sources.
Table 1 shows that over the twelve year period
from 1984 to 1995, New York City relied on property taxes for about
a quarter of its revenues--the actual range was from 22 percent to 27
percent. Even during periods of recession, property taxes constituted
the largest source of New York City revenues. For example, in 1987,
the year of the stock market crash, which marked the end of the boom
era in New York City, 23 percent of city income was generated from property
taxes. This was the same proportion as in 1984, when the city was enjoying
an economic boom. In the 1990s, the proportional share of city income
generated by property taxes inched a little higher (by 1-2 %), but remained
relatively constant through the recession of the early 1990s and even
into the recovery of the mid-1990s.
table 1
General Fund Revenues
go to larger image
Compared to other municipalities, however, property taxes comprise
a smaller share of New York City's revenue base. And, because it relies
less on property taxes, New York City is forced to depend on other revenue
streams that are more susceptible to fluctuations in the level of economic
activity. This complicates balancing the budget, as municipal revenues
will rise and fall more dramatically in relation to the performance
of the local economy.
Cities tend to rely less on sales taxes than property taxes as sources
of income. According to Sharp, on average, cities obtain 16 percent
of their revenue from the sales tax. The biggest problem with the sales
tax as a source of municipal revenue is its susceptibility to changes
in the economic cycle. Sharp explains that the potential of sales taxes
to generate significant revenues depends directly on the level of local
economic activity. (26)
In good economic times, people simply spend more than during a recession,
which directly affects the amount of sales tax revenues collected by
the city. As Table 1 indicates, the proportion
of New York City revenues generated by sales taxes from 1984 to 1995
mirrors the performance of the local economy, which confirms Sharp's
claims. The portion of revenues from the sales tax was constant fi:om
1984 to 1989. It declined steadily from 1990 to 1994, with a slight
recovery in 1995. In short, New York City's reliance on sales and consumption
taxes has exposed it to the vicissitudes of the economic cycle.
Another tax that is quite sensitive to changes in the performance of
the local economy is the corporate income tax (this is included in the
category called "Other" in Table 1).
New York City's fiscal and economic fortunes are closely linked to the
FIRE sector, particularly the financial service sector. For example,
from 1991 to 1993, the cumulative increase in municipal income from
taxes on the securities industry exceeded $11 billion. When higher interest
rates in 1994 triggered a drop in bond values and investment banking
activities, profits for the industry plummeted from the record $8.6
billion in 1993 to $1.2 billion in 1995. As a result, the city's fiscal
year 1995 tax revenue collections fell $431 million short of the level
projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. (27)
Local income taxes, according to Sharp, are used mostly by large cities
and tend to be more reliable than the sales tax. Herson and Bolland
assess income taxes as sensitive to the economic climate in general,
but are particularly affected by changes in levels of unemployment.(28)
As Table 1 indicates, the proportion of revenue
derived from the New York City's income tax fluctuated from 17 percent
in 1984 to 19 percent in 1993 and in direct relation to recessionary
and expansionary periods. In 1994 and 1995, as unemployment eased, the
income tax share of city revenues grew to 20 percent and 21 percent,
respectively.
Income taxes also contract when businesses migrate to other areas.
For instance, corporate flight from central business districts, according
to Herson and Bolland, produces a loss in the number of high paid executives,
corporate lawyers and professional staff. (29)
This proves costly to cities as they lose the income of these workers
as well as their taxes. Peter G. Gosselin reports that New York City's
position as the nation's premier financial center has declined. (30)
According to Gosselin, a steady exodus of banks, brokerage houses and
insurance companies in recent years has left the city grabbing at thin
air. Vacant space in office buildings remains stubbornly at 25 percent,
15 percent higher than what real estate specialists consider to be healthy.
The loss of major corporate firms, in short, threatens the fiscal base
of the city and portends future distress. (31)
In the 1960s there was a growing reliance by local governments on federal
aid. Intergovernmental aid to cities, however, has declined since the
late 1970s. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration's New Federalism,
which was an attempt to relieve local fiscal dependence on the federal
government, rolled back federal aid to local governments. As Sharp points
out, dependence on federal aid in particular declined by an average
of 6 percent between 1977 and 1983. Federal cuts, however, effected
only a modest decline in New York City's dependence on intergovernmental
aid, which slipped from 36 percent in 1984 to 33 percent in 1987. Intergovernmental
aid as a proportion of city revenues remained at 33 percent for the
remainder of the decade. In the 1990s, intergovernmental aid varied
only slightly, from 33 percent to 34 percent. Intergovernmental aid,
however, has little impact on a city's structural imbalance because
such aid is largely categorical in nature, providing reimbursement to
the city for expenses incurred. That is, it is only after expenditures
have been incorporated into the budget that the intergovernmental aid
is included.
Since intergovernmental aid plays a very limited role in budget balancing,
the onus for supporting normal recurring expenditures falls squarely
on the shoulders of locally generated revenues, consisting of property
and non-property taxes and miscellaneous receipts. Because most of these
revenue streams are sensitive to economic trends, fiscal policy making
in New York City is all the more volatile. Decline or stagnation in
the economic activity that produces these revenues may seriously curtail
the discretion of municipal leaders in making fiscal policy.
Although the city's revenue base is diversified, the particular mix
has failed to insulate city budgets from the sort of fiscal instability
caused by changes in the business cycle. Overall then, New York City's
revenue structure is fairly sensitive to the performance of its local
economy.
To demonstrate how shifts in New York City's economy have imposed constraints
on fiscal policy-making, the following compares the ways in which the
Koch and Giuliani administrations coped with problems of raising revenues
in good times and bad.
The Koch Era: 1978-1990
During the 1980s, under the mayoral administration of Edward Koch,
New York City experienced an unprecedented economic boom. For example,
the FIRE sector, which is the engine that drives the local economy,
grew by 18.3 percent between 1980 and 1989, or at an annual rate of
1.9 percent. Private sector employment, in turn, increased by 8 percent
over the decade (32) The
city's workforce rose to 3,608,000 in 1989, from 3,302,000 in 1980--
a 9.3 percent increase or an annual growth rate of 1.0 percent. The
unemployment rate fell to a remarkably low 5.8 percent. (33)
As a result, the city's expenditures grew from $13 billion in 1978 to
$25 billion in 1989, as measured in 1983 constant dollars. (34)
This rapid growth in tax revenues, in turn, enabled the city to increase
the number of city employees and diversify its array of services. In
this economic context, Koch promoted private investments, advocated
budgetary reform, facilitated real estate development, and assisted
community-based social service providers.(35)
On the revenue side, the city collected a substantial amount of income
from the sectors that grew in direct proportion to the increased economic
activity. The real estate market saw property values rise significantly,
generating more tax revenues from higher assessed valuations. Similar
growth rates were evident in other revenue streams. After a slight dip
between 1980 and 1983, real retail sales grew by 9.8 percent between
1980 and 1989, or 1.0 percent annually. From 1983, retail sales grew
from $37.9 billion to $44.2 billion in constant 1989 dollars (36)
Translated, this means that, during the 1980s, the Koch administration
was receiving more sales tax revenues every fiscal year. In short, as
each revenue stream responded to the rise in economic activity, city
revenues grew.
The prosperity of the mid-to-late 1980s fueled the expansionary policies
pursued by the Koch administration. Economic growth enabled Koch to
enlarge almost all aspects of city government operations. City operating
expenditures decreased modes fly during the post fiscal crisis period
from 1980 to 1983. During the recovery years from 1983 to 1989, however,
expenditures grew from $20.4 million in 1983 to $24.5 million in 1989,
as measured in constant 1989 dollars (37)
In addition, city government employment rose 26.6 percent from 1980
to 1989, reaching 238,383 employees at the end of 1989 (an increase
of 50,037 full-time city workers). Inflation adjusted or real income
increased over the same period by an average of 2.6 percent annually,
equaling $154 billion in 1989 constant dollars (38)
With a robust local economy generating higher revenues, the Koch administration
was also able to increase its capital commitments dramatically. Indeed,
city capital expenditures grew explosively over the decade by 275.8
percent, from $836 million in 1980 to $3,142 million in 1989 (39)
Given the relative prosperity that the city was enjoying, fiscal policy
making was less constrained. As a result, Koch was able to divert much
more money to capital spending than was possible immediately after the
fiscal crisis.
The Giuliani administration: 1993-1996
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, in sharp contrast to Koch's last several years
in office, has faced a more difficult fiscal situation. Given the lackluster
performance of the economy in the 1990s, the city has encountered the
dual fiscal strains of rising expenditures and shrinking tax revenues.
Of the two, rising expenses have posed the greater challenge to the
Giuliani administration in terms of achieving structural balance.
In the mid-1990s, the city experienced sluggish economic growth, only
slowly rebounding from Wall Street's downturn in 1995. Actions by the
Federal Reserve in 1995, in their attempts to curb inflationary pressures
at the national level, placed unusual strains on New York's economy.
Recent reductions in interests rates, however, may revive the city's
financial and interest-rate sensitive sectors, thus paving the way for
a full recovery. Nonetheless, with the unemployment claims at 9 percent
in the beginning of 1995, the city has only barely begun to recover.
For example, New York saw only a slight growth in the number of jobs.
Total employment grew by 14,500 in the local economy for the first three
quarters in 1995. As a consequence, the unemployment rate (not seasonally
adjusted) for New York City for the first nine months in 1996 dropped
to 8.3 percent (40) This
constituted only a modest improvement over the 1995 rate of 8.5 percent,
but was still far higher than the 1989 rate of 5.8 percent.
What is more, real wages for many New Yorkers have stagnated. The average
wage for New Yorkers, after adjusting for inflation, declined by 1.1
percent from 1994 to 1995, (41)
which means that earnings for most workers possess less purchasing power
today than 5 years ago. Depressed wage levels may have resulted from
the shift from high-paying to low-paying jobs in New York's labor market.
That is, over the last few years, New York City has tended to lose higher
paying jobs, while the economy has added jobs in industries with lower
than average wages.(42)
Nevertheless, the slight increase in private sector jobs, which totaled
25,600 for the first three quarters of 1995, reversed a downward trend,
since, in recent years, job losses in government have offset the growth
in the private sector. This engendered a 0.4 percent growth in overall
employment, which was clearly an improvement over last year's net loss.
To date, New York has managed to regain only 28 percent of the private
jobs lost during the protracted recession of 1989-1992. (43)
Table 2
Debt ratios for selected fiscal years

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The Giuliani administration came into office with an agenda to implement
conservative fiscal management measures. The dismal economic climate
provided a rationale for Giuliani's fiscal austerity agenda. Indeed,
examining New York City's budgets from fiscal years 1990 to 1995 reveals
that the local economy has abetted Giuliani in this task. First, from
1991 to 1995, general fund revenues grew by 15 percent ($4.1 billion)
or about 3 percent per year. This rate of increase was at about the
same as inflation, which means no growth occurred in real terms. In
1995, general fund revenues totaled $31.6 billion, up $238 million or
0.8 percent from 1994, which was far below the rate of inflation. This
small increase in city revenues reflects the slow pace of growth in
the local economy. (44)
Second, the Giuliani administration has tried to reduce the debt ratio
in the face of slow revenue growth and rising expenditures. Table
2 reports that debt service from 1993 to 1995 halted its precipitous
rise, both as a percentage of total expenditures and as a proportion
of general fund revenues (excluding categorical aid). In 1995, debt
service as a percentage of total expenditures stood at 7.2 percent,
down by 0.9 percent from 1993. Debt service as a percentage c>f general
fund revenues other than categorical aid remained relatively high at
11.0 percent, following a 0.8 percent reduction from 1993. For fiscal
years 1991 to 1995, long term debt service stood at $470 million, with
a $4.1 billion increase in general fund expenditures during the same
period.
Recently, however, the city's borrowing costs have rapidly escalated,
which alarmed the city's fiscal monitors. The city's outstanding debt
is reportedly at an all time high of $30 billion, not much less than
its current budget of $33 billion, (45)
Mounting debt service, in turn, has curtailed the Mayor's ability to
spend more in other areas he has deemed necessary, such as foster care,
park clean-ups, picking up garbage, or, as he often lmnents, reducing
the city's tax rates. Despite reassurances given by Joseph J. Lhota,
the Mayor's budget director, the fiscal monitors remained very worded,
since rising debt service is a clear indicator that fiscal danger lies
ahead.
The current estimated costs of debt service, which reached $3 billion
in 1996, (46) stems largely
from two factors: the declining local economy and capital spending on
sorely needed infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and schools. Robert
A. Kurtter, the Vice President at Moody's Investors Service, summed
up the dilemma faced by the city as follows: "The city can't afford
to borrow more because its debt burden is high, but at the same time
it can't not afford to borrow more because its infrastructure needs
are so great." (47)

Although greatly affected by the performance of the local economy,
city budgets are highly political documents and bear the mark of a grueling
process of fiscal policy making. That is, a city's budget sets out a
plan for managing municipal fiscal affairs, while at the same time defining
mayoral policy priorities and preferences. Few if any policies receive
allocations without a political agenda. Moreover, according to Shefter
and Fuchs, there is a political context that constrains the choices
municipal leaders make in fiscal policy making. Politics creates exigencies
within the already constrained economic environment, determining "who
gets what and who gets cut." (48)
In short, Peterson's "City Limits" theory that fiscal policies
are largely products of economic conditions is far too mechanistic to
explain the nuances of municipal expenditure decisions.
The political context that frames decision-making in the fiscal arena
consists of competing sets of interests. These interests form the blocks
of political power in a city. Moreover, amid the demise of local political
parties in urban politics, municipal leaders have been forced to become
adept independent political operators who must mediate among the competing
blocks of political interests. Mollenkopf suggests that mayors face
three types of competing sets of interests: (1) public sector producer
interests (inside local government); (2) constituency interests; and
(3) private market interests (with special attention given to large
corporations that exercise considerable discretion over private capital
investment) (49) These
differ only a little from Martin Shefter's two sets of interests discussed
earlier. (50) From these
three sets of interests, according Mollenkopf, "political actors
in municipal government, in order to govern, must construct and maintain
a dominant coalition by using city government's relationships with its
economic and political/electoral interests to win elections."(51)
From this conception of local governance, it becomes clear that political
leaders face a major dilemma. That is, the problem of striking a balance
between forging a winning electoral coalition, on the one hand, and
attracting and retaining private investments in the city, on the other.
(52) Mayors who fail to
achieve this political balance inevitably experience very short public
careers as chief executives in city government.
In assessing the role that politics plays in the fiscal policy-making
in New York City, this paper adopts a somewhat modified version of Mollenkopf's
analytical framework. First, constituency interests can be further divided
into Shefier's two types of electoral coalitions: service demanders
and money providers. Service demanders constitute the poor and ethnic
racial minorities who tend to contribute less in the way of taxes, but
are heavy users of the city social services, school system and other
redistributive services. In contrast, the money providers include homeowners,
small business owners, and other property interests who generate substantial
amounts of tax and other revenues for the city but place fewer direct
demands on redistributive services. Private market interests, in turn,
are composed of businesses that contribute large amounts to the city's
coffers and depend on the city to provide a favorable climate for investment.
As Mollenkopf indicates, the business community's "tax payments
provide the bulk of the city's revenues; their investment capital is
required to bring public development initiatives to fruition; their
senior executives or partners provide the bulk of campaign financing
and post government employment opportunities for departing senior official;
and they exercise extensive influence over institutions that shape mass
and elite public opinion." (53)
Finally, public sector producer interests (local government) are the
city's public employees in city agencies.
To ascertain the role politics plays in shaping New York City budgets,
this section compares the expenditure side of fiscal policy making during
the mayoral administrations of Edward Koch and Rudolph Giuliani. The
extent to which budget decisions made by these two mayoral administrations
conform to Mollenkopf's political coalition thesis will demonstrate
whether city officials indeed formulate fiscal policy by responding
to the demands of the different blocks of political interests in the
city.
THE KOCH ERA: 1978-1990
Mayor Koch was able to transform a very successful electoral coalition
into an effective governing coalition. His electoral alliance included
white, ethnic, middle-class voters, and conservative African Americans
and Latinos. Furthermore, Koch's "electoral popularity and strong
support from the financial and real estate development interests that
benefited from his policies gave him the base from which to convert
an electoral coalition into a solidly entrenched governing coalition."
(54) No where else is this
more evident than in the executive budgets proposed by Koch over the
12 years of his mayoral administration. The Koch administration reduced
redistributive functions, such as welfare, while making increased private
investment in the city's economy a high priority. Koch created a highly
conservative governing coalition of powerful corporate and business
elites whose interests he staunchly protected. (55)
That is, Koch's pro-growth developmental policies provided direct benefits
to New York City's business community.
Table 3
NYC Expenditures by Major Functions

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Constituency Interests
In the aftermath of the 1975 fiscal crisis, the Koch administration
favored the "revenue providers" over the "service demanders."
The expenditure side of city budgets during Koch's mayoral administration
reflects the concerns of Koch's coalition. Table
3 reports New York City expenditures for the fiscal years 1978,
1983 and 1989. Spending increased across most areas of city services
proportionate to total spending, except in redistributive services.
The proportion of expenditures allocated for development-related operating
costs grew from 7.3 percent to 8.9 percent of total spending. Education
spending increased its share of the budget by 3.6 percent, reaching
28.9 percent in 1989. In addition, spending for criminal justice and
fire protection edged up from 13.6 percent in 1983 to 15.1 percent in
1989. Finally, redistribution expenditures, as a share of the city's
budget, fell from 40.9 percent in 1978 to 34.8 percent in 1983, although
the amount increased in current dollars.
Table 4
NYC Expenditures by Object

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Table 5
Capital Expenditures by Function

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Examining public spending in the Koch years by object (see Table
4), we see redistributive expenditures again suffering cuts. Medicaid
as a proportion of total expenditures dropped precipitously from 8.4
percent in 1978 to 4.4 percent in 1983, and dipped slightly to 4.3 percent
in 1989. Public assistance, while declining, suffered only modest cuts
by comparison. Public assistance spending edged downwards from 9.7 percent
of the budget in 1978 to 7.0 percent in 1989. It is clear that, while
Koch embarked on an expansionary fiscal policy strategy overall, the
growing budget allocations differentially affected the competing blocks
of political interests in the city. In other words, the Koch administration
pursued a political agenda that reduced the share of the budget that
went to service demanders-- the city's poor.
Table 5 reports the distribution of capital
expenditures across different functions from 1980 to 1989. The most
dramatic increase in capital spending was in corrections, which expanded
from $5.2 million in 1980 to $169.1 million in 1989, a whopping 3195.5
percent increase. This rapid rise in corrections spending can be seen
as part of the Koch's administration's war on crime, which entailed
locking up more criminals. (56)
Capital spending on housing grew substantially from $32.4 million in
1980 to $366.6 million in 1989. However, much of this provided financing
for lower middle-class housing. (57)
Health, however, only received moderate increases in capital spending,
totaling $119.3 in 1989. Other spending areas that experienced large
growth were overhead functions, parks and libraries.
Private Market Interests
In forming a governing coalition, Koch closed ranks with the city's
conservative business elite. The product of this alliance was the promotion
of a number of large-scale development projects, which included the
construction of the Jacob Javits Convention Center, the South Street
Seaport, the Columbus Circle Project, Hunter's Point Redevelopment Project
and the extensive, yet, highly controversial Times Square Redevelopment
Project. All centered on business districts and secured lucrative benefits
for private market interests. The Times Square Development Project,
the most extravagant, was estimated to cost more than $2.5 billion.
The city granted tax abatements worth $650 million over 20 years and
allowed office development to exceed prior zoning limits. Such concessions
were emblematic of the Koch administration development policies. (58)
In addition, the Koch administration, through the Industrial and Commercial
Incentive Board, granted discretionary tax exemptions to firms that
undertook office building construction in the city. This was done despite
many doubts about the practice of giving tax abatements to commercial
projects in the city's business districts. The Time Square project alone
was granted $650 million in tax abatements. The National Broadcasting
Corporation (NBC), through its parent company General Electric (GE),
received $100 million when it threatened to leave the city. Chase Manhattan
was granted $235 million to encourage its owners to build a new operations
center in downtown Brooklyn. In sum, the Koch administration used its
tax abatement policy to create a favorable business environment to attract
and retain corporate and commercial investments. At the same time, according
to Mollenkopf, the Koch administration asked for little in return in
the way of concessions from companies and only weakly enforced the commitments
to which firms agreed. (59)
Capital budget expenditures in the Koch years also show a clear bias
in favor of private market interests. Table 5
reports the distribution of capital expenditures across different functions
from 1980 to 1989. The Koch administration increased spending in almost
all functions. However, the more substantial increases took place in
economic development, roads, police and corrections. The allocations
to economic development and Department of Transportation (roads) in
1980 were $26.4 million and $140.8 million respectively, ballooning
to $72.6 million and $421.8 million, respectively, in 1989. In comparison,
spending on mass transit rose slowly, increasing only by 12.1 percent
over the same period, from $421.1 million to $472.1 million.
Public sector producer interests
New York City employs more than a quarter of a million people, most
of whom are represented by organized labor unions. Owing to the sheer
size of public union membership, which includes District Council 37
of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and Teamsters Local
237 (housing authority workers), city unions represent a potent electoral
force. That is, public unions are able to mobilize voters at election
time and, therefore, exert considerable influence over elected officials.
(60)
To balance municipal budgets, the Koch administration endeavored to
trim city payrolls and thereby achieve labor cost savings. City workforce
reductions accounted for two-thirds of the total amount that municipal
spending was cut from 1978 to 1983. Public sector producer interests
(municipal unions), as a result, were clearly losers in the budget politics
of the early 1980s. This was a reversal of their fortunes during Abe
Beame's tenure as mayor (1974 and 1978), when municipal unions wielded
substantial political clout owing to their ability to mobilize votes.
Public sector producer interests, however, did not suffer pay cuts out
of proportion to other expenditure lines. Other categories such as OTPS
(other than personal service), welfare, and debt service payments were
reduced by much larger amounts. As Table 4 reports,
the city payroll, as a share of the total budget, increased by 7.7 percent
from 1978 to 1983, which was a recovery period. Although the Koch administration
reduced spending on labor costs immediately after the fiscal crisis,
by 1989, public employment had been restored to pre-fiscal crisis levels.
Payroll expenditures grew a further 12 percent from 1983 to 1989, encompassing
53 percent of all municipal expenditures in that year. Even OTPS, which
are expenditures that go to third party contract services, saw slight
increases. In addition, real wages rose and the city's workforce gained
36,498 employees from 1978 to 1989. According to Mollenkopf, much of
this increase in city employment took place in the areas of police,
corrections, education and social services. (61)
Not surprisingly, among public sector producer constituencies, Koch
received the most political support from unions in these service areas.
Table 6 1993
Mayoral Election by Assembly District Type

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THE GIULIANI ADMINISTRATION: 1993-1996
Elected in 1993 as the city's first Republican mayor in twenty years,
Rudolph Giuliani garnered the majority of his votes from the city's
more conservative and middle class voters. Further, it appears that
Giuliani has sought to replicate the model of coalition building employed
by Koch. That is, Giuliani constructed a conservative electoral coalition,
resembling, in part, Koch's constituencies of white middle-class Jewish
and Catholic voters. However, New York's large and diverse immigrant
population has meant that appeals be made to the growing and potentially
powerful ethnic and minority voters in New York City. Cognizant of this
fact, Giuliani's policies have been racially and ethnically sensitive.
Mayor Giuliani, then, has realized that in order to be effective he
must build and maintain a majority electoral coalition that is multi-racial
and multi-ethnic. Therefore, having secured strong support from the
more conservative white Jewish and Catholic middle class, Giuliani has
extended his appeal to affluent and middle-class African-American and
Latinos and the business community. Table 6 reports
the share of constituencies that voted for Giuliani. Giuliani received
the most votes from white Catholics, outerborough Jewish constituencies
and white liberals-- an unusual mix of both liberals and conservatives.
However, white Catholics and conservative middle-class voters, rather
than white liberals, make up Giuliani's core electoral constituencies.
To consolidate his position, Giuliani has fashioned a policy agenda
that reflects the middle-class interests of his political base,
which has included the kinds of fiscal policies that appeal to his electoral
coalition. From the onset of his administration, Giuliani has sought
to restructure city government in fundamental ways by setting municipal
priorities that conform to the more conservative views of his constituency.
The austere budgets that the Mayor has proposed over the last two years
have made it clear where these political priorities lie. First, Giuliani
has sought to reduce social service expenditures as a means to balance
the budget and thus establish the city's fiscal policy on a more conservative
basis. Secondly, to satisfy the business community, which has closely
monitored his performance, Giuliani has endeavored to enlarge development
expenditures as a way to stimulate economic growth. Third, Giuliani
has sought to hold the line on labor costs through tough bargaining
with the city's powerful unions.
Constituency Interests
Entering the Mayor's office facing a grim $2.3 billion deficit, and
acting on the premise that the municipal government was too large, Giuliani
issued several proposals to reduce the size of the government while
still maintaining core services. In his first year, he sought to "resolve
the City's structural deficit" (62)
by implementing a number of austerity measures. These included reducing
the city payroll, consolidating agencies, privatizing city services,
selling city assets, reforming welfare, and consolidating collections
of money owed to the city. Many of these austerity measures were designed
to reward supportive constituencies and punish Giuliani's political
opposition.
Importantly, the way in which fiscal austerity was implemented favored
money providers over service demanders. First, because it was widely
held that New York City's municipal government was out of control and
needed to be reined in, the Mayor's budget proposed severe cuts that
went largely unopposed by the Democratic City Council. In spite of the
cuts, however, the city continued to face a projected budget gap of
$2.7 billion for fiscal year (FY) 1994, which was $400 million higher
than the 1993 deficit. Still encountering deficits in FY 1995, Giuliani
adopted a $31.6 billion budget that sliced $358 million from education
and another $129 million in social services. He also proposed personnel
cuts of 15,000. (63) Social
services had traditionally been one of the fastest growing sectors of
the city's budget, which often thwarted efforts by city officials to
achieve structural balance. Guided by the conservative tenet that liberal
welfare policies have sapped the vitality of New York's recovery, however,
Mayor Giuliani has implemented draconian cuts in social services to
curb or reduce the city's commitments to redistributive expenditures.
To date, the Giuliani administration has reduced the welfare rolls by
122,000. (64) This has
won him praise for lowering the city's spending. In addition, the Giuliani
administration has streamlined social services as a cost-cutting strategy.
In terms of reordering municipal priorities, however, Giuliani has
been less successful. Table 7 depicts the city's
expenditures by function for the period from 1993 to 1995. As indicated,
the distribution of expenditures does not match the Mayor's conservative
rhetoric or his political priorities. In spite of Giuliani's attempts
at cost-cutting, since 1993, growth in redistribution, education and
protection has persisted. Although most of these represent slight increases,
it demonstrates how intractable levels of redistributive expenditures
can be.
table 7
New York City Expenditures
by Major Function,
Selected Fiscal Year, (in $ millions)

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Also, despite the cuts implemented, deficits loomed larger, as the
city failed to resolve its fiscal troubles. The austere $32.7 billion
budget for FY 1996 stirred up a storm in the fiscal arena. Drafted in
the usual conservative fashion, the FY 1996 budget would trim overall
spending and make sharp reductions in everything from the police force
to park rangers, from treatment for alcoholics to subsidies for private
buses (65)
The Mayor drew sharp criticisms from citizens and advocacy groups on
the severity of the cuts as "the reductions [once again] raise
the specter of an erosion in services coming as they do on top of two
years of severe belt-tightening." (66)
Furthermore, for the FY 1996 budget, the Mayor encountered stiff opposition
from the Democrat-controlled City Council, which not only contested
the severity of the proposed cuts, but also had a political agenda of
their own. In a direct challenge to the Mayor, the City Council issued
a $1.4 billion school reconstruction plan for the FY 1996 budget. This
proposal to build new schools and repair others, advanced by Peter F.
Vallone, the City Council Speaker, would be financed by extending the
life of a 12.5 percent personal income tax surcharge for three more
years. The surcharge was to expire in 1996. Initially this was rejected
because the Mayor's proposed budget included the expiration of this
sur6harge as part his tax-reduction package. However, in the end the
Mayor had to concede to the Council's wishes, which checked his impulses
to trim mainline service provision.
Table 8
Capital Expenditures by Function and Agency

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Finally, as with the Koch administration, capital expenditures clearly
reflect Giuliani's conservative fiscal agenda. Table
8 indicates, capital spending on redistribution, which includes
social services, housing and health, incurred dramatic reductions. Allocations
for social services fell precipitously from $49.6 million in 1993 to
$27.9 million in 1995. Capital spending on housing was reduced from
$431.3 million to $291.9 million over the same period. Capital expenditure
on health dropped from $173.0 million in 1993 to $155.2 million in 1995.
In addition, spending on mass transit decreased from $249.8 million
to $150.2 million over the same period. Capital spendings for education,
parks, and libraries claimed only modest increases. In sum, service
demanders clearly have fared much worse than money providers in the
distribution of capital expenditures during the Giuliani administration.
Private Market Interests
In conjunction with holding the line on social services expenditures,
the Giuliani administration has committed greater resources to promoting
economic development. The capital budget expenditures displayed in Table
8 favor Giuliani's private market interests allies. Under Mayor
Giuliani, the city has invested a much larger share of the capital budget
to economic development, building roads, repairing highways (Department
of Transportation). Capital expenditures for economic development increased
from $56.1 million in 1993 to $136.8 million in 1995 Allocations to
the Department of Transportation grew from $340.6 million to $444.3
million over the same period. Such large capital allocations confer
major benefits on the Mayor's private market constituencies, especially
the developers of central business district properties. Also, as with
Koch, the use of capital spending to improve infrastructure and provide
competitive services serves the purpose of retaining New York City's
corporate firms.
In light of the lethargic pace at which the local economy has been
recovering, the Giuliani/administration also proposed a tax-reduction
package in FY 1995. This meant huge losses in city revenues in the short
run, but promised to produce a resurgence in the local business activity
over the long haul. Indeed, the apparent boost to the city's retail,
tourism, and convention industries that resulted after reductions in
the hotel and the commercial rent taxes has strengthened the Mayor's
resolve to pursue "carefully targeted tax reductions in order to
stimulate the economy." (67)
Subsequently, the Mayor crafted a proposal that called for: (1) elimination
of the sales tax on clothing purchases trader $500; (2) discontinuation
of the 12.5 percent personal income tax surcharge upon expiry in 1996;
and (3) lowering the property tax on co-operatives and condominiums.
The proposed tax cuts, which total $428 million, appear to be politically
motivated, given the big cuts that the Mayor has been making on spending.
That is, these tax cuts, although ostensibly based on an economic rationale,
upon closer scrutiny, maybe products of political considerations, as
they also appeal strongly to New York City's powerful business community.
Additionally, in his resolve to provide an environment conducive to
private investment, Giuliani has granted generous tax abatements to
major firms in New York City to convince them to remain in the city.
For example, Peter Gosselin reports that the city has granted an estimated
$350 million in tax breaks, as corporate flight persists as a threat
to the city's economy. (68)
The Giuliani administration has engendered strong support from the
business community for his pro-active approach to economic development.
Both his capital budget and general expenditure budget have provided
substantial investments in economic development that favor the city's
business real estate developers and corporate investors. Giuliani's
highly guarded tax reduction package, (described above) though unsuccessful,
was also an earnest attempt to curry favor with the business community.
A few of the targeted tax breaks that did pass, however, such as the
hotel tax and the commercial rent tax, which realized huge savings for
the city's tourism and retail industries.
Public Sector Producer Interests
In trying to secure the support of public sector producer interests,
Giuliani has worked hard not to incur the wrath of the "politically
potent union" (69)
of public school teachers during contract negotiations. As one of the
largest municipal unions, Giuliani has taken great pains not to alienate
teachers, but rather to elicit their support or at the very least not
provoke their enmity. For example, in winning a concession of a two-year
wage freeze, the Giuliani administration agreed to allow teachers with
22 years of experience to earn a maximum annual salary of $70,000. That
is, the newly negotiated teacher's contract basically deferred all salary
increases into the future, ultimately saving the city some $15 million
(in 1996 dollars). This provision, which takes effect in 1999, postpones
the impact on the city budget. Nonetheless, it may be a problem that
Giuliani will face if reelected for another term. The strategy of postponing
fiscal impacts to future budgets is also the principle upon which negotiations
with other municipal unions was based. That is, while reducing city
payroll by some 22,000 jobs, the Giuliani administration has granted
wage increases in several long-term contracts that take effect in 1998.
These contracts impose no cuts in benefits. In other words, in trying
to avoid provoking strong opposition from municipal unions to his 1997
re-election bid, Giuliani undoubtedly has saddled himself or his successor
with potentially severe fiscal distress in the future.
THE IMPORTANCE of "CITY LIMITS" and POLITICAL COALITIONS
in URBAN FISCAL POLICY
The analysis of fiscal policy making during the Koch and Giuliani administrations
suggests that both economic and political factors are important for
explaining New York City's budgetary decisions over the last two decades.
First, the comparison of revenue patterns in the Koch and Giuliani administrations
suggests that fiscal policy-making is limited by constraints imposed
by thee economy. Moreover, given that New York City's revenue base relies
more heavily than most other localities on income taxes and sales taxes,
the city's budget is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the
economy. This has meant that levels of revenues have contracted or expanded
in accordance with the pace of the local economy. Economic growth during
the 1980s enabled Koch to embark on expansionary fiscal policies. That
is, prosperity enlargened the city's tax base, which, in turn, allowed
Koch to allocate much higher levels of expenditures to a wide range
of city services. Conversely, the recession-ridden economy of 1990s
eliminated this option for Giuliani. The recession constrained fiscal
decision-making by shrinking or stifling the city's revenue base. The
rise in debt service also constrained fiscal policy-making in the 1990s.
The economy, in other words, established parameters for fiscal policy-making
in both cases. How money was spent, however, was more a matter of politics.
The politics of coalition building played a key role in determining
patterns of New York City's expenditures during the Koch and Giuliani
administrations. Both Koch and Giuliani sought to maintain their conservative
political coalitions of money providers and private market interests
by shifting fiscal priorities away from redistributive expenditures
and towards basic service (police, fire, etc.) and developmental spending.
This was particularly evident in the city's capital budgets. Both Koch
and Giuliani also sought to neutralize the city's power fid public sector
interests by buying them off with concessions. This was easier for Koch
in the economic boom years of the mid-to, late 1980s when the city's
revenue base was expanding.
Nevertheless, the Giuliani administration devised a way of postponing
concessions to unions into the future, which, at least in the near-term,
allowed the city to close the persistent revenue-expenditure gap.
Simply put, the "city limits" imposed by economic factors
appear to be most important for explaining New York City's revenue generation
policies, while the imperatives of political coalition building have
had their greatest impact on expenditure decision making. To know whether
this holds for urban fiscal policy making in general, however, case
studies of other large cities are needed.

1 Elaine B. Sharp, Urban
Politics and Administration: From Service Delivery to Economic Development
(New York: Longman, 1990), p. 159.
2 Paul Peterson, City
Limits (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
3 Ibid., p.4.
4 Ibid., Chapters 2,10.
5 Ibid., p.4.
6 Ibid., p.42.
7 Ibid., p. 188.
8 Martin Shefter, Political
Crisis/Fiscal Crisis. The Collapse and Revival of New York City
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), p.4.
9 See also Todd Swanstrom,
"Urban Populism, Fiscal Crisis, and the New Political Economy,"
in Cities in Stress, ed. M. Gottdiener, (California:
Sage Publications, 1986), pp.81-105.
10 Shetier, Political
Crisis/Fiscal Crisis, p. 121.
11 Ester Fuchs, Mayors
and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 179-272.
12 Ester Fuchs, "The
Permanent Urban Fiscal Crisis,' in Breaking Away
(New York, 1995), p. 49.
13 Roger Alcaly and Helen
Bodlan, "New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Economy," in the
The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities, eds.
R.E.Alcaly and D. Mermelstein, (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p.31.
14 Fuchs, Mayors
and Money, p. 88.
15 Alcaly and Bodian,
"New York's Fiscal Crisis,"pp. 30-36.
16 Municipal Assistance
Corporation, New York City 1975-1995, 1995.
17 Office of the State
Comptroller, Recent Trends in the New York City
Economy (November 1, 1995), pp. 1-7.
18 Ibid.
19 Citizens Budget Commission,
Guiding Principles for Changing Times (April
21, 1995), p.2.
20 Ibid., p. 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Office of the Mayor,
Statement by Mayor Edward L. Koch, (May 9,1988).
23 Fuchs, Mayors
and Money, p. 148.
24 Sharp, Urban
Politics and Administration, p. 155.
25 Ibid.
26 Sales tax is very regressive.
Middle and upper income families can afford to spend more money on clothes,
food, vacation etc. than a poor family.
27 Office of the State
Comptroller, Recent Trends in the New York City
Economy (November 1, 1995), p. 19.
28 Lawrence Herson and
John M. Bolland, The Urban Web: Politics, Policy
and Theory (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), pp. 327-328.
29 Ibid., p.328.
30 Peter G. Gosselin,
"Wall Street Hits the Wall," The Boston
Globe (June 28, 1996), p. 1.
31 Ibid., p. 4.
32 Ibid.
33 Employment data from
New York State Department of Labor.
34 Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p. 10.
35 Ibid., p.7.
36 Citizens Budget Commission,
Political Leadership in the Two New Yorks.
Fiscal Policy in the late 1990s (June 1993), p.9.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Data was provided by
the New York City Department of Labor, August 1996.
41 Office of the State
Comptroller, Recent Trends in the New York Economy
(November 1, 1995), p. 13.
42 Ibid., p.48.
43 Ibid., p. 15.
44 City of New York, Comprehensive
Annual Financial Report of the Comptroller (1991 to 1995 editions).
45 Clifford J. Levy, "New
York Fiscal Monitors Warn of Rising Debt Cost," The
New York Times (August 27,1996), p. B3.
46 Ibid
47 Ibid
48 Ibid., p.2.
49 Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p.44.
50 Shefter, Political
Crisis/Fiscal Crisis, p.4.
51Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p.69.
52 See also Judd and Swanstrom,
City Politics, pp.307-366.
53 Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p.64.
54 Ibid., p.4.
55 Ibid., p.6.
56 Overcrowded jails like
Rikers Island were often described as the largest penal colony in the
world.
57 Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p. 136-137.
58 Ibid., PP. 142-146.
59 lbid., PP. 142-149.
60 Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes, p.73.
61 Ibid., p. 152.
62 The New York Law School,
Structural Balance and the New York City Financial
Plan. A Intellectual History, 1990-1993, p. 16.
63 Fuchs, "The Permanent
Urban Fiscal Crisis," Breaking Away,
p.69.
64 David Firestone, "Trust
Me, Giuliani Says, Striking a New Theme," The
New York Times (May 17, 1996), p. B3.
65 Steven Lee Myers, "Giuliani
Offers an Austere $32.7 Billion Budget" The
New York Times, (May 10, i996), p. A1.
66 Ibid
67 Ibid.
68 Gosselin, "Wall
Street Hits the Wall."
69 The
New York Times, "Teacher's Union and Giuliani Reach a Contract
Much Like the Rejected One" (May 5, 1996).

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